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aBstraCt 
Increasing community and political concern about excessive alcohol consumption and 
related harms in Australia has prompted calls for the introduction of tighter regulatory 
controls. From an evidence-based, research perspective, measures which increase 
alcohol prices and taxes, in particular, are considered most effective for reducing alcohol 
consumption and related harms. Accordingly, this report presents a review of pricing 
and taxation policy levers that have been considered and/or implemented nationally 
and internationally. These policies include: alcohol taxation and differential price by 
beverage; special/additional taxation on alcopops; minimum pricing; and bans on price 
discounts and promotions. Industry response to these policy initiatives is discussed, in 
addition to the role of public opinion in policy-making, and the issue of substitution and 
complementarity with other drugs. This review is designed to inform policymakers of 
useful taxation and pricing policy levers to redress alcohol-related harm in the Australian 
community. We conclude that each policy holds some promise, and it appears that they 
would be more successful when used in combination than as individual uncoordinated 
strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION
Alcohol has played an integral role in the social and cultural fabric of Australian 
society since the early days of colonisation (Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy, 2001; 
Midford, 2005). For Australians, alcohol is associated with celebrations, religious and 
cultural ceremonies, social and business events, as well as recreational activities. In 
2009-10, Australia’s apparent per capita consumption of pure alcohol was 10.4 litres 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011a). Heavy alcohol consumption is a major risk factor 
for burden of disease, contributing to violence, chronic diseases, and mental disorders 
beyond alcohol use disorder. 
In 2003, for instance, alcohol consumption accounted for 3.2 per cent of the total 
burden of disease and injury in Australia (Begg et al., 2007). The estimated social cost 
of alcohol misuse to Australian society stood at $15.3 billion in 2004-05 (Collins & 
Lapsley, 2008). Laslett et al. (2011) found that 70 per cent of Australians queried in a 
national survey indicated that they were affected by others’ drinking and experienced 
nuisance, fear or abuse; 28 per cent reported negative effects from the drinking of 
someone close to them. Indeed, if one takes account of the alcohol costs imposed on 
others around the drinker (costs not considered by Collins and Lapsley), heavy drinkers 
cost others over $13 billion in out-of-pocket expenses, forgone wages or productivity. 
Hospital and child protection costs incur a further $765 million, and intangible costs are 
estimated to be at least $6 billion (Laslett et al., 2010). Against this background, alcohol 
misuse was recently flagged as a critical health prevention priority by the National 
Preventative Health Taskforce (2009).
Healthy living guidelines regarding alcohol consumption vary markedly according to 
national context and time. In Australia, healthy adults are advised to consume no more 
than two standard drinks on any day to reduce their lifetime risk of harm from alcohol-
related disease or injury. Furthermore, they are recommended to drink no more than 
four standard drinks on a single occasion to reduce the risk of alcohol-related injury 
arising from that occasion (National Health and Medical Research Council, 2009). Of 
significant public health concern, one in five Australians consume alcohol at levels 
which put them at risk of harm from alcohol-related disease or injury over their lifetime. 
Furthermore, two in five adults drink alcohol (at least once in the last year) in a pattern 
that places them at risk of an alcohol-related injury from a single drinking occasion 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). 
Over the past decade, there have been growing public health concerns particularly 
regarding excessive drinking among young people (Jones & Lynch, 2007a). Findings 
from the 2007 National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing indicate that 11.1 per 
cent of young Australians (aged 18 to 24 years) met diagnostic criteria for a past-year 
DSM-IV alcohol use disorder. Moreover, risky2 levels of alcohol consumption were 
observed, with 60 per cent of these young adults consuming five or more drinks per day 
at least once a week; this was also accompanied by high rates of co-occurring DSM-IV 
mental disorders and disability (Mewton, Teesson, Slade & Grove, 2011).  
Amid concerns of a ‘binge drinking epidemic’3 among young Australians, legislative 
measures which aim to reduce alcohol consumption and related harms have become 
increasingly prominent on federal and state government policy agendas (Livingston 
et al., 2010). In March 2008 the Rudd Government announced a $53.5 million 
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National Binge Drinking Campaign primarily targeting teenagers and young adults. 
The campaign, which ran from 21st November 2008 to 30th June 2010, included a $20 
million social marketing campaign and $19.1 million to fund early intervention and 
diversion programs4. The Rudd Government also increased the tax applied to premixed 
drinks or alcopops, discussed in more detail below. At state level, alcohol restrictions 
on large wine casks targeting indigenous heavy drinkers have been introduced in the 
Northern Territory and Western Australia. 
From the repertoire of policies that have been implemented and evaluated both 
nationally and internationally, those which increase alcohol prices and taxes are 
considered to be most effective in reducing alcohol consumption and related harms 
(Anderson, Chisholm, & Fuhr, 2009; Babor et al., 2010; Toumbourou et al., 2007; 
Wagenaar, Salois, & Komro, 2009). At the heart of the effectiveness of such policies is 
the consistent finding that population level alcohol consumption is inversely related to 
alcohol prices (Babor et al., 2010; National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 
2010; Purshouse, Meier, Brennan, Taylor, & Rafia, 2010; World Health Organization, 
2009a), although, the price of alcohol needs to increase at least at the rate of inflation to 
impact on consumption (World Health Organization, 2004). 
More specifically, economists measure the way people respond to price changes with 
‘own price elasticity of demand’, defined as the percentage change in the quantity 
consumed that results from a 1 per cent change in price. The own price elasticity 
of demand depends on the availability of substitute products (Fogarty, 2010). Two 
recent systematic reviews suggest that a 10 per cent increase in the price of alcohol is 
associated with a 5 per cent decline in overall consumption. Hence, demand for alcohol 
is relatively price inelastic, indicating that it has relatively few substitute products (Gallet, 
2007; Wagenaar et al., 2009). Demand for particular alcohol beverages also appears to 
be relatively inelastic, although demand for beer is more inelastic than demand for wine 
or spirits (Elder et al., 2010; Fogarty, 2010; Gallet, 2007; Wagenaar et al., 2009). One 
review estimated mean own price elasticities of -0.46 for beer, -0.69 for wine, and -0.80 
for spirits (Wagenaar et al., 2009) while another reported median elasticities of -0.36 for 
beer,  -0.70 for wine, and -0.68 for spirits (Gallet, 2007). In terms of the mean elasticity 
for beer, for instance, an elasticity of -0.46 means that for every 10 per cent increase in 
the price of beer, consumption would fall by 4.6 per cent. 
The aim in presenting these summary elasticities for alcoholic beverages is not to give 
the impression that price responsiveness is somehow an inherent feature of the beverage. 
Rather, it varies with “groups, situations and times” and reflects “particular meanings and 
uses of alcoholic beverages across diverse social and cultural environments” (Wagenaar 
et al., 2009: 189). While it might seem “intuitively appealing” for price responsiveness 
to differ from country to country, Rabinovich et al. (2009: 37) conclude that there is 
insufficient evidence to draw conclusions about international differences. Gallet (2007) 
reports that younger people are less responsive than older people to price changes and 
Wagenaar et al. (2009) find that heavy drinkers are price responsive.
Given the well-established associations between population level and individual level 
alcohol consumption and morbidity and mortality, it is perhaps unsurprising, but still 
of some significance, to find that a range of studies have shown that alcohol prices 
and taxes are significantly and inversely related to indicators of alcohol-related disease 
and injury (Elder et al., 2010; Wagenaar, Tobler, & Komro, 2010). According to one 
of the meta-analyses, doubling the alcohol tax in the USA would reduce alcohol-
related mortality by an average of 35 per cent, traffic crashes by 11 per cent, sexually 
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transmitted diseases by 6 per cent, violence by 2 per cent, and crime by 1.4 per cent 
(Wagenaar et al., 2010).
Young people and heavy drinkers respond to increases in alcohol prices (Chaloupka, 
Grossman, & Saffer, 2002; Kuo, & Heeb, Gmel, & Rehm, 2003a; Skov, 2009; World 
Health Organization, 2009b; Wagenaar et al., 2009), although young people may be 
less responsive than older people (Gallet, 2007). In light of the public health significance 
of targeting excessive alcohol consumption, particularly among young adults, and amid 
recent calls for Australian alcohol policy reform (Hall & Chikritzhs, 2011; National 
Preventative Health Taskforce, 2009), this report provides a timely overview of the 
pricing and taxation policies available to government. 
The report will evaluate the pricing and taxation policies outlined in Babor et al.’s 
(2010) strategy and intervention framework, drawing on cases where these policies have 
been implemented or considered nationally and internationally. The policies considered 
include: (i) taxation and differential price by beverages; (ii) special/ additional taxation 
- alcopops tax; (iii) minimum pricing of alcohol; and, (iv) a ban on price discounts and 
promotions. Industry responses will be noted where possible. The report will conclude 
with a succinct summary of each policy (including implications for Australian policy 
reform efforts), a review of the role of public opinion in policy formulation, and a 
discussion of substitution and complementarity with other drugs.
The information presented in this report was derived from the scientific literature as 
well as grey literature which comprises government reports, media releases and related 
websites in order to reflect the most up-to-date policy proposals and developments. The 
review process for this report was not a systematic review in the technical sense that 
all the available evidence on the alcohol taxation and pricing policies listed above was 
examined. Rather, this review offers a compendium of the national and international 
literature, summarising the key research in the field to inform policy-makers of taxation 
and pricing pathways to reduce alcohol-related harm. As detailed below, a careful 
search of key databases was undertaken, with no restrictions placed on publication date.
For the alcohol taxation section, the following methods were employed: 
–	 A	literature	search	was	conducted	in	PubMed,	Science	Direct,	and	PsycINFO	using	
the keywords “alcohol” AND “tax”, “alcohol” AND “taxation”, “alcohol” AND 
“pric*”. 
–	 A	web	search	was	conducted	to	retrieve	submissions	by	the	Distilled	Spirits	Industry	
Council of Australia relating to alcohol taxation. 
–	 Reference	lists	from	obtained	articles	and	review	papers	were	scanned	to	identify	
potentially relevant citations. 
For the special tax on alcopops section, the following methods were employed:
–	 A	literature	search	of	PubMed,	Science	Direct,	PsycINFO,	and	the	Euromonitor	
International database was conducted using the search terms “alcopops”, “ready-to-
drink”, “alcopops” AND “tax”.
–	 The	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	website	was	searched	to	retrieve	yearly	reports	
on patterns of national levels of alcopops consumption.  
–	 A	web	search	was	conducted	to	retrieve	submissions	by	the	Distilled	Spirits	Industry	
Council of Australia relating to alcopops. 
–	 Reference	lists	from	obtained	articles	and	review	papers	were	scanned	to	identify	
potentially relevant papers.
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For the minimum pricing of alcohol section, the following methods were employed: 
–	 A	search	was	performed	in	PsycINFO,	PubMed,	Factiva,	Google	News,	Google,	
BBC News, the UK House of Commons Library, and each of the websites relating 
to the UK’s four devolved Assemblies to retrieve relevant papers, media releases 
and government reports. The keywords included: “floor price” AND “alcohol”, 
“minimum pric*” AND “alcohol”, “minimum floor price”. Much of the campaign 
for minimum pricing has been based in the UK, which gathered pace following the 
re-election of the Scottish National Party in April 2011; to facilitate updates that 
reflected the most current developments electronic news alerts were set up through 
Google News using these same keywords.
–		 A	literature	search	of	the	RAND	Corporation	website	was	undertaken	using	the	
same keywords and the reference lists of the relevant publications derived were 
scanned to identify potentially relevant papers.  
For the bans on promotions and discounts section, the following methods were 
employed: 
–		 Guidelines	for	alcohol	promotions	in	each	state	and	territory	were	identified	
through a search of government websites.
–	 Personal	communication	with	the	relevant	licensing	commission	in	each	state	and	
territory was undertaken to seek further information on the implementation of the 
guidelines in practice and establish whether or not the guidelines are enforceable 
and mandatory.
NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY
Standard drink
In the UK, a standard drink contains 8 grams of alcohol (10ml), whilst in Australia a 
standard drink comprises 10 grams of alcohol (about 12.7ml). While useful devices for 
linking price and taxation with consumption and public health, it should be stressed that 
these definitions of a standard drink are rules of thumb used by researchers and in health 
promotion pamphlets. Numerous studies have shown in Australia and elsewhere that 
people pour and consume in much larger units of ethanol (Stockwell, Zhao, Chikritzhs, 
& Greenfield, 2008).   
Off-trade
Off-trade refers to outlets (e.g., supermarkets, independent shops such as grocers) which 
sell alcohol to the public for consumption off the premises. In Australia, the terms off-
trade, off-sales, off-premise, and bottleshops are used interchangeably; in the UK the 
equivalent term is off-licence(d). Throughout the report, all terms denoting off-trade sales 
of alcohol will be used interchangeably. 
On-trade
On-trade refers to establishments (i.e., pubs, restaurants, hotels, and clubs) where 
alcohol must be consumed on the premises, though most can also sell alcohol to be 
consumed off the premises. In Australia, the terms on-trade, on-sales, and on-premise 
are used interchangeably; in the UK the equivalent term is licensed. Throughout the 
report, all terms denoting on-trade sales of alcohol will be used interchangeably.
5What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress 
excessive alcohol consumption and related harms in Australia
ALCOHOL PRICES AND AFFORDABILITY 
Before reviewing each of the taxation and pricing policies, it is worthwhile discussing 
alcohol affordability, which takes into account income as well as price. Consumption 
of alcohol - and beer, wine and spirits individually - increases when income rises 
and decreases when income falls (Fogarty, 2010). Although most research in this area 
focuses on price, some recent research has paid attention to affordability (Rabinovich et 
al., 2009) and some studies have shown that price effects can be mediated by income 
(Booth et al., 2008).
Relative to consumer items in general, the price of alcohol has increased gradually over 
the last two decades (see Figure 1). Australia’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures 
changes in the price of a fixed basket of goods and services typically purchased by 
Australian households. The alcohol products in this basket include a range of beer, wine 
and spirits products typically bought in bottle shops and bars, clubs and restaurants. In 
2005, based on household expenditure shares for each of the beverages, beer prices 
contributed 44 per cent to the alcohol price index, wine prices 36 per cent and spirits 
20 per cent (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Figure 1 displays the price indexes 
of alcohol products compared with the CPI. Since 1990, alcohol prices have increased 
16 per cent more than has the CPI; but that is not the case for all alcoholic beverages. 
Whereas spirits (particularly after the alcopops tax increase) and beer have become 
more expensive relative to consumer items in general, wine has become substantially 
less expensive over the past decade. 
Figure 1. Prices of alcoholic beverages relative to prices of all consumer items  
(December 1989 is parity), Australia, March 1990 to March 2011
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011b).
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But what about affordability to the average Australian, where affordability is seen as the 
relationship between income and the price of alcohol? Following the approach used 
by Rabinovich et al. (2009) we calculated an affordability index, defined as the ratio of 
real disposable income to an index of the relative price of alcohol to consumer items 
in general. Rabinovich et al. (2009) based their measure on the official UK measure of 
alcohol affordability published by the UK National Health Service (NHS). Our measure 
indexed real disposable income to 100 in 1994/95. The relative price of alcohol index is 
the ratio of the alcohol price index to the CPI (presented in Figure 1) indexed to 100 in 
June 1995 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011b). 
Our measure of disposable income does not suffer from Seabrook’s (2010) criticisms 
of the UK measure used by Rabinovich et al. (2009). Whereas the UK measure is a 
population level measure derived from the National Accounts, we use the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics measure of median equivalised real disposable income, based on 
individual level estimates of gross income, income tax liability, the Medicare levy and 
the Medicare levy surcharge (sourced from Survey of Income and Housing [SIH] data) 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011c). 
Furthermore, the Australian measure does not include imputed rental income for 
owner-occupiers or income from insurance policies, and does not treat housing costs 
inconsistently. The equivalised disposable income estimate for any household is the 
amount of disposable cash income that a single person household would require to 
maintain the same standard of living as the household in question, regardless of the 
size or composition of the latter. Gross income includes employment income, business 
income, investment income, transfers from other households and cash transfers 
from government pensions and allowances. The income estimates are adjusted by 
equivalence factors to accommodate the fact that larger households normally require 
more income to maintain the same material standard of living as smaller households, 
and the needs of adults are normally greater than the needs of children. Account is taken 
of the economies of scale that arise from the sharing of dwellings. 
While satisfied that the affordability index, as the ratio of real disposable income to real 
alcohol prices, implicitly compares disposable income with alcohol prices, Seabrook 
(2010) is concerned that it was over-complicated and somewhat deceptive to present 
the components in real terms. We disagree. The literature has shown that alcohol 
consumption responds to changes in real alcohol prices, rather than alcohol prices per 
se, and to changes in levels of real income. 
The index of affordability, presented in Figure 2, alongside the component indexes of 
relative alcohol prices and real disposable income, was 100 in June 1995. An index 
value of 101 means that affordability has increased by one per cent relative to its value 
in 1995. Affordability increases or decreases as a result of two processes: (i) changes in 
the price of alcohol relative to all other consumer goods and services and (ii) changes 
in (real) disposable income. Affordability increased substantially, by over 40%, between 
1995 and 2008, due entirely to the increase in real disposable income. Over the same 
period, alcohol prices increased a little more than consumer prices overall. Between 
1996 and 2004 alcohol also became more affordable across most of Europe. As in 
Australia, growth in real disposable income was the prime reason in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland (Rabinovich et al., 2009). The affordability index decreased between 2008 
and 2010 (from 142 to 136), as a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
induced decline in real disposable income and alcohol prices rising more quickly 
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than the CPI. Both the decline in real disposable income, which was not statistically 
significant (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011c), and increase in real alcohol prices 
would dampen consumption of alcohol.
As a cautionary note, it is important to be mindful that self-reported alcohol 
consumption yields estimates of per capita consumption that fall substantially below 
alcohol sales data, with coverage typically ranging from 40 per cent to 60 per cent of 
known alcohol sales data (Stockwell et al., 2004). Stockwell et al. identify a number of 
factors that could contribute to under-reporting including: (i) under-representation of 
alcohol dependent individuals, problem drinkers, and certain demographic subgroups 
(e.g., young people); (ii) poor memory recall when queried about alcohol consumption 
over a long period of time; (iii) inability to make accurate estimates of average intake; 
(iv) disparities in assumed standard drink sizes and alcohol content; and (v) under-
sampling of high-risk drinking periods throughout the year.
Figure 2. Affordability of alcohol in Australia from 1995 to 2010
Note.  Estimates of real disposable income for 2007-08 and 2009-10 are not strictly comparable with estimates for previous 
years due to the improvements made to measuring income introduced in the 2007-08. Estimates for 2003-04 and 
2005-06 have been re-compiled to reflect the new measures of income, however not all components introduced are 
available to present the years on a comparable basis. Real disposable income increased by 48 per cent between  
1994-95 and 2009-10 after adjustment for this break in series. Without adjustment the increase is 53 per cent 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011c).
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POLICY 1. ALCOHOL TAXES AND DIFFERENTIAL 
PRICE BY BEVERAGE 
According to the World Health Organization Expert Committee on Problems Related 
to Alcohol Consumption (World Health Organization, 2007), taxation represents the 
most cost-effective alcohol policy for reducing alcohol-related problems, particularly for 
countries with high levels of hazardous drinking. Recent systematic reviews highlight 
the strength of scientific evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of taxation in curbing 
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms (Elder et al., 2010; Wagenaar et al., 
2009, 2010). However, due to the paucity of taxation reforms, most of the studies 
incorporated in these reviews analyse price changes; the assumption being that a 
taxation change will be passed through to prices. 
Alcohol tax is but one part of the retail price of alcoholic beverages. Price also reflects: 
value added tax (goods and services tax [GST]); costs of production, transportation and 
advertising; the demand for and supply of alcoholic beverages; the level of competition 
(between retailers and between producers); whether the beverage is purchased from a 
licensed venue or from a bottle shop, or liquor store; and what quantity is purchased 
(Rabinovich et al., 2009). It is the behaviour of buyers and sellers that determines how 
much of the tax is passed on to consumers (Fullerton & Metcalf, 2002). Alcohol taxes 
tend to be paid by alcohol manufacturers or importers, and can be included in prices 
passed on to wholesalers, retailers and ultimately consumers. 
The research community is unsure about the extent to which taxes are passed on to 
consumers (Rabinovich et al., 2009). It is thought that licensed premises would be 
more likely to pass on tax increases while bottle shops and liquor stores, particularly 
those associated with large retailers or supermarkets, are better placed to absorb price 
increases associated with taxes. They have the ability to cross-subsidise from one 
alcohol product to another and even from food items to alcohol (HM Treasury, 2010; 
Rabinovich et al., 2009). In support of this claim, the UK Treasury cites the fact that UK 
alcohol prices in supermarkets have not risen to the same extent as alcohol duties over 
recent years whereas prices in UK pubs have risen by more than the increase in duties. 
Furthermore, there is variation in the extent to which tax changes are passed through 
to prices in supermarkets, with mainstream products most likely to be discounted (HM 
Treasury, 2010).
US research on tax pass-through is inconclusive. Two studies found that aggregate level 
retail prices of alcohol could respond more than fully to tax changes (Kenkel, 2005; 
Young & Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002), whereas a more sophisticated analysis of beer prices 
concluded that a one per cent increase in the beer excise tax was associated with a 
0.13 per cent increase in beer prices only (Harding, Leibtag & Lovenheim, 2010). More 
importantly this small body of research illustrates how tax changes impact differentially 
on retail prices of alcohol within a jurisdiction, depending on geographic location, 
type of beverage, brand and point of sale (Harding et al., 2010; Hunt, Rabinovich, & 
Baumberg, 2011; Kenkel, 2005; Young & Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002). Drinkers will be 
differentially affected by taxation, depending on where they live, where they drink and 
what they drink. 
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RECENT INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT  
OF TAXATION ON CONSUMPTION, RELATED HARMS,  
AND SALES
As noted earlier, Wagenaar et al. (2010) systemically reviewed the impact of alcohol 
taxes and prices on alcohol-related morbidity and mortality, and estimated that doubling 
the alcohol tax in the USA would lead to substantial reductions in alcohol-related 
mortality, traffic crash deaths, sexually transmitted diseases, violence, and crime. To 
further demonstrate how reductions in alcohol taxation impact alcohol consumption 
levels and related harms, the following section reviews papers published mainly since 
the major meta-analyses by Wagenaar et al. (2010) and Gallet (2007). Specifically the 
papers focus on the consequences of changes in alcohol policy in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden between 2003 and 2006.
In brief, on January 1st 2004, tax-free travellers’ allowances of alcohol imported from 
other EU countries into Denmark, Sweden, and Finland were removed. To discourage 
the anticipated increase in imports (and reduction in consumption of domestically 
produced spirits), on 1st October 2003 the excise tax on distilled spirits in Denmark was 
reduced by 45 per cent. It was anticipated that the reduction in the price of distilled 
spirits and abolition of the import restrictions would primarily impact southern Sweden. 
Traditionally, Swedes have tended to import alcohol (in large quantities) from Denmark. 
Finnish excise duties on distilled spirits were reduced by 44 per cent, fortified wine by 
40 per cent, table wine by ten per cent, and beer by 32 per cent from 1st March 2004, 
ahead of Estonia’s entry into the EU on 1st May 2004. Estonia is within close proximity of 
Finland and traditionally has levied low taxes on alcohol. The policy changes in Finland 
were anticipated to primarily impact Northern Sweden, which is geographically closer 
to Finland (Bloomfield, Wicki, Gustafsson, Mäkelä, & Room, 2010).
In Finland, the tax cuts resulted in a 19 per cent increase in alcohol consumption. 
Moderate to heavy alcohol consumption increased in men and women in response 
to the price cut, primarily in those aged 45 years or older and in the group with the 
lowest level of education. Heavy episodic drinking was more common in the lowest 
educational group and increases were greatest for men in the lowest educational 
group (Helakorpi, Mäkelä, & Uutela, 2010). Time-series analyses of Finnish aggregated 
monthly deaths between 1996 and 2006 indicated that alcohol-related mortality 
increased amongst men and women aged 40 years and over, though no apparent 
change occurred among younger people (Herttua, Mäkelä, & Martikainen, 2011a). 
Time-series analyses of Finnish monthly aggregated hospitalisations between 1996 and 
2006 indicated that a reduction in alcohol prices led to increases in alcohol-related 
hospitalisation rates, particularly among older adults (Herttua, Mäkelä, & Martikainen, 
2011b). 
With regards to Denmark, Bloomfield, Rossow and Norström (2009) applied time-series 
analysis to data on violent assaults and hospitalisations for acute alcohol intoxication 
from 2003-2005. The authors observed a significant 26 per cent increase in the number 
of acute alcohol intoxication hospitalisations amongst Danes aged 15 years and 
younger. A borderline significant effect of increased alcohol intoxication among young 
Danes was associated with the removal of EU travellers’ allowances.
By contrast, Bloomfield et al. (2010) analysed annual cross-sectional surveys of 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden from 2003 to 2006, and found that alcohol problems 
generally decreased overall, except in northern Sweden and Finland and among older 
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age groups and men. Gustafsson (2010) conducted a telephone survey of a sample of 
adults from the Swedish general population which similarly revealed that overall rates of 
reported alcohol problems in northern and southern regions of Sweden did not change. 
Similar findings of no apparent change in consumption in Denmark, Finland and 
southern Sweden (northern Sweden was used as control site) were reported by Mäkelä, 
Bloomfield, Gustafsson, Huhtanen, and Room (2008). 
AUSTRALIAN ALCOHOL TAX SYSTEM 
The extant alcohol taxation system in Australia is complex, and has been described as 
“incoherent” (Henry Review, 2010: 436) and “a dog’s breakfast” by the President of the 
Public Health Association of Australia (Salleh, 2010). Most goods and services, including 
alcohol, attract a 10 per cent GST. Beyond this, beer, wine and spirits are taxed at 
different rates and beer is taxed differentially. 
Domestically produced and imported wine is taxed as a percentage of its wholesale 
price (i.e., ad valorem tax); this so-called wine equalisation tax (WET) comprises a 
29 per cent tax on the wholesale price of wine5. Hence, wines with the same alcohol 
content are taxed at different rates. Domestically produced beer, spirits, liqueurs and 
other beverages attract excise duties according to their pure alcohol content by volume 
(abv)6 (i.e., volumetric excise) (see Table 1). Comparable imported alcoholic products 
attract customs duty incorporating a component at the same rate as the excise rate. Beer 
is taxed at eight different rates with excise duties varying according to alcohol strength 
(low, mid, full strength), means of sale (whether draught, on-trade, or in bottles and 
cans, off-trade), and the purpose of sale (commercial or non-commercial) (Australian 
Government, 2011a). The first 1.15 per cent of pure alcohol in beer is exempt from tax 
and a relatively low tax is imposed on low-strength beer sold on-trade (but not off-
trade) as an incentive for increased production and consumption of these low-alcohol 
Table 1. Excise rates for alcohol in Australia as of 1st February 2011
Commodity 
Rate ($ per litre 
of pure alcohol)
Beer (per litre of alcohol over 1.15%)
Draught beer, low strength (<=3%) 7.33
Draught beer, mid strength (<=3.5%) 23.01
Draught beer, high strength (>3.5%) 30.11
Other beer, low strength (<=3%) 36.71
Other beer, mid and strength (<=3.5%) 42.78
Non-commercial, low strength (<=3%) 2.58
Non-commercial, mid and high strength (>3%) 2.98
Other beverages, not exceeding 10 per cent alcohol content (per litre of alcohol) 72.46
Potable spirits (per litre of alcohol)
Brandy 67.66
Other spirits, not exceeding 10 per cent alcohol content 72.46
Source: http://www.aph.gov.au/budget/2011-12/content/download/bp1_bst5.pdf (accessed 6 May 2011)
Note. Draught beer is beer served from a pressurised keg or cask
Non-commercial beer is made on commercial premises for non-commercial use
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beverages (<= three per cent abv). Brandy is taxed at a lower rate compared to stronger 
spirits. Excise rates are increased in February and August each year, in line with the CPI. 
The tax on wine is also effectively indexed, since the WET is a proportion of the price of 
wine.
Anderson (2010a) provides an overview of Australia’s special tax treatment of wine. In 
brief, an excise tax of $0.50 per gallon was first levied on wine in 1970 but removed 
two years later due to its unpopularity. A wholesale sales tax of 10 per cent was imposed 
in 1984, which gradually increased to 41 per cent by 2000. When the ten per cent GST 
on all goods and services was introduced in July 2000, the wholesales sale tax was 
replaced by the WET. The composite of the GST and WET generates approximately the 
same amount of revenue as the tax they replaced. Because the value-based tax favours 
cheaper wines, which are often made by larger producers, October 2004 saw the 
introduction of the WET rebate (up to $500,000 per annum) for wineries on the first $1.7 
million of sales, which effectively exempts small wineries from the WET. The WET rebate 
was extended to New Zealand wine producers in July 2005 (Henry Review, 2010). 
In summary, as illustrated in Figure 1, the tax rate per unit of pure alcohol is highest for 
spirits and mixed drinks containing wine or spirits (or ready-to-drink beverages; RTDs), 
slightly lower for brandy, and lower again for beer. Beer is lower in strength compared 
to pure spirits and brandy, but of similar strength to RTDs. In 2008, the tax rate on RTDs 
was increased to be commensurate with spirits. Draught beer is taxed at a lower rate 
than beer sold in bottles or cans, so that beer consumed on-trade is generally taxed less 
than beer consumed off-trade. The effective tax rate per litre of alcohol by volume in 
wine is relatively low for inexpensive wine but relatively high for expensive wine. 
The alcohol content of Australian wine has increased incrementally since the late 
1980s with the trend for winemakers to enhance the flavour of the wine by using very 
ripe fruit, thus producing more alcohol during fermentation. Accordingly, the latest 
estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics7 of the average alcohol content of 
wine are approximately 12.7 per cent (13.4 per cent for red table wine and 12.2 per 
cent for white table wine). The tax per litre of alcohol is constant for spirits and RTDs, 
regardless of alcohol content, whereas it increases with alcohol content of beer and falls 
with alcohol content of identically priced wine (see Figure 3). The tax rate can also be 
presented in terms of the standard drink, by dividing the tax rate per litre of alcohol by 
78.9. For example, the tax rate for spirits and RTDs is $0.91 per standard drink; the rate 
for 4 per cent abv beer sold off-license is $0.39 and the rate for similar beer sold on-
license is $0.27; and the rate for the cask wine represented in Figure 2 with 12 per cent 
abv is $0.05.
Like Australia, European countries and the USA tax wine, beer and spirits differentially, 
taxing some products on an ad valorem basis and others according to volume of 
pure alcohol. Spirits attract the most tax in relation to litres of pure alcohol. Low or 
zero taxation of wine is common among major wine-producing countries (e.g., Italy, 
Germany) whereas countries like the USA, UK and Ireland tax beer less heavily than 
wine. In Australia, on-trade sales of beer are taxed less heavily than off-trade sales, 
whilst the reverse is true in the USA (Chaloupka, 2010; Österberg, 2011). 
A recent international comparison of alcohol tax, based on consumer tax equivalents 
(CTEs)8, revealed that in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA in 2008, 
the tax rate for spirits and super premium wine ($20/litre at the wholesale pre-tax level) 
was highest in the Nordic countries, Ireland and Australia. Beer tax in Australia was 
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Figure 3.  Current effective (specific) alcohol tax by beverage and alcohol content by volume
Note. WET calculated using half-retail method.
higher than in any of these countries. In contrast, Australia’s tax rates for low ($2.50/litre) 
and medium priced wines ($7.50/litre) comprised a significantly smaller proportion of 
the wholesale price than in these countries (Anderson, 2010b). Specifically, by alcohol 
volume, Australia’s super-premium9 wine consumers face a CTE more than three times 
greater than the average for high-income countries, while its non-premium consumers 
face a CTE of only half that of high-income country averages. Australia’s beer CTE is 
approximately seven times more than the average of high-income countries, and its 
spirits CTE is more than double. 
It should be noted that since Anderson’s comparison was made, some important 
increases in alcohol taxation have occurred in the UK; these changes are discussed in 
detail later. Another recent study, which used the effective excise tax per litre of alcohol 
as the comparator, found that Finland’s beer excise rate exceeded Australia’s rate in 
2010, and the UK rate was not far below Australia’s. However, Australia’s excise rate on 
spirits was surpassed only by Sweden’s (Fogarty, 2011).
Volumetric tax system. In 2008, the Rudd federal government commissioned a panel 
to provide a comprehensive review of Australia’s taxation system. The resultant report, 
entitled ‘Australia’s Future Tax System’, was presented to the Government in December 
2009 (Henry Review, 2010). The Henry Review concluded that the social costs 
associated with alcohol abuse were not effectively targeted by current tax arrangements 
and recommended a gradual move towards a common volumetric tax system whereby 
all alcoholic beverages would be taxed at a common rate according to alcohol content 
that accounted for spillover costs from alcohol abuse, with a 1.15 per cent low alcohol 
threshold. In particular, they called for the elimination of the WET and move from ad 
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valorum taxation of wine to a volumetric basis as a key priority. 
The Henry Review acknowledged that there may be particular social harms arising 
from drinking in certain environments, drinking in certain ways, or drinking by certain 
individuals (such as those prone to becoming violent when intoxicated). However, 
they concluded that while taxes could be differentially levied on alcoholic beverages 
according to their associated risk of social harm there was insufficient evidence of causal 
association to identify classes of alcohol products towards which taxation should be 
directed. Although a recent review of the literature finds some evidence that spirits and 
beer appear to be associated with a higher risk of harm than wine, it concludes that 
more evidence is needed for certitude (Doran, Byrnes, Vos, Petrie, & Calabria, 2011). 
In May 2010, the Rudd Government released the Henry Review together with their 
response entitled Tax policy statement: Stronger, Fairer, Simpler - A tax plan for our 
future (Australian Treasury, 2010). The volumetric tax recommendation was rejected on 
the basis that the wine industry is undergoing restructuring and is in the middle of a wine 
glut10.  
Byrnes, Cobiac, Doran, Vos, and Shakeshaft (2010) recently investigated the public 
health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Based 
on several alternative volumetric tax scenarios, the authors concluded that the policy 
would achieve significant health gains and cost savings to the health sector compared to 
the extant taxation system. Whilst a volumetric taxation system is beneficial in principle 
for achieving health gains, it is also associated with some caveats and determining the 
rate at which this tax is set is critical. For instance, under a volumetric tax system the tax 
on relatively low priced wine would increase considerably. This would be welcomed 
from a public health perspective since under the current arrangements (i.e., value-based 
WET) the cheaper the wine, the less it is taxed. This has resulted in the production of 
large volume, cheap cask wine which is taxed at $0.05 per standard drink (compared to 
$0.32 of mid-strength beer) and consumed by harmful drinkers (National Preventative 
Health Taskforce, 2009). However, a common rate of tax per litre of pure alcohol could 
also see the price of low-strength beers increase and the average price of stronger drinks 
such as spirits and RTDs decrease considerably. 
In their report ‘Australia: the healthiest country by 2020’, the National Preventative 
Health Taskforce (2009) acknowledged the pitfalls of a common volumetric tax 
and recommended adopting a ‘tiered’ volumetric alcohol taxation approach. In a 
tiered approach the tax rate increases with alcohol content, both between beverages 
and within beverages, thus providing incentives for increased production and 
consumption of low-strength alcoholic beverages and disincentives for the production 
and consumption of higher strength alcoholic beverages. The National Alliance for 
Action on Alcohol (NAAA), which was established in 2009 and comprises over 50 
leading Australian health organisations, similarly supports a tiered volumetric tax11. An 
argument for taxing spirits more heavily than beer and wine is that a drinker can become 
intoxicated more quickly drinking spirits. Indeed spirits are more strongly associated 
with alcohol poisoning and aggressive behaviour than other alcoholic beverages 
(Mäkelä, Mustonen, & Österberg, 2007). Another motivation for taxing spirits more 
heavily than other products is that they are cheaper to produce than other products and 
could potentially be priced more cheaply (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010).
The Henry Review (2010) noted that whilst a volumetric tax would provide a floor price 
so that cheap alcohol, such as cask wine, was more heavily taxed, alcohol could still be 
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sold below-cost or given away. For such reasons, the NAAA and National Preventative 
Health Taskforce also advocate for minimum pricing to complement volumetric alcohol 
taxation. Furthermore, both advocate for hypothecation of some taxation revenue to 
be used for measures designed to reduce harmful drinking. A portion of the revenue 
from the alcopops tax has been flagged to fund the National Binge Drinking Campaign 
and the COAG National Partnership Agreement on Preventative Health (Australian 
Government, 2010). Furthermore, the NAAA argues that any alcohol taxation reform 
should increase or maintain the price of every alcohol product, except for low-alcohol 
beer, and supports an overall increase in taxation and continued real increases into 
the future. Table 2 provides a summary of the recommendations made by these public 
health organisations and alcohol industry groups.
The Government’s rejection (Australian Government, 2010; Australian Treasury, 2010) 
of the volumetric tax system proposed by the Henry Review and National Preventative 
Health Taskforce was met with disappointment (National Alliance for Action on Alcohol, 
2010). As part of an agreement to form a minority Labor government following the 
August 2010 election, the incumbent Prime Minister Julia Gillard pledged to convene 
a Federal Tax Forum on 4-5th October 2011 to discuss tax reform and re-examine the 
Henry Review recommendations12. The government reiterated its commitment not 
to change alcohol taxation in the middle of a wine glut and industry restructure in 
the Tax Forum discussion paper (Australian Government, 2011b). In July 2011, 15 
representatives from the NAAA, met with over 50 MPs and senators at Parliament 
House to urge the government to consider alcohol pricing reform (including volumetric 
Table 2. How do Australian public health organisation and industry sources envisage alcohol 
taxation policy reform?
Health body
Volumetric  
taxation
Overall 
increase 
in tax 
rate
Real price 
of alcohol 
should 
increase 
over time
Any change 
should 
increase/
maintain 
price, 
except if 
low alcohol 
product
Floor price and 
hypothecation 
of some tax 
revenue 
to fund 
interventions
Not tiered Tiered*
Henry Review ü
National Alliance for 
Action on Alcohol 
(NAAA)
ü ü ü ü ü
National  
Preventative Health 
Taskforce
ü ü
Distilled Spirits  
Industry Council 
Australia (DSICA)
ü
Note. * Tiered tax rate increases according to abv and/or potential to cause harm 
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taxation and minimum pricing) on the Forum agenda (National Alliance for Action on 
Alcohol, 2011a). In September 2011, the NAAA held a Tax Forum, hosted by the AMA 
in Canberra. They used the Forum as a platform for calling for urgent alcohol taxation 
reform to address alcohol-related harms in Australia, including volumetric taxation 
and targeting of the WET and WET rebate (National Alliance for Action on Alcohol, 
2011b). Indeed, two of Australia’s major wine manufacturers (Premium Wine Brands and 
Treasury Wine Estates) have called for the abolition of the WET which they argue has 
fuelled the extant glut (Metherell, 2011).
In terms of industry response, Anderson (2010b) points out that the beer and spirits 
industry have called for tax equality across alcoholic beverage types, and fine wine 
manufacturers have indicated support for volumetric taxation, provided it does not result 
in an overall increase in wine taxes. The Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia 
(2009a), which represents the interests of distilled spirits and RTD beverage producers 
and importers in Australia, have also called for volumetric taxation. In their submission 
to the Henry Tax Review the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia not only expressed 
their concern about the implications for the wine industry of a volumetric tax. They were 
also of the view that moderate drinkers of wine, who they claimed to be the majority of 
wine drinkers, would be unfairly disadvantaged by the resultant price increase (WFA, 
2009). A recent report prepared for the Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation (AER) 
Foundation presents evidence which suggests that the WFA may have exaggerated 
claims about the implications for production and employment in the industry. The report 
also points out the potential benefits to moderate wine consumers from reductions in 
government expenditure associated with harmful alcohol consumption and increased 
taxation revenue (Richardson & Denniss, 2011). 
The October Tax Forum has led to recent proposals and modelling analyses of 
alternative options for reforming the extant WET and WET rebate arrangements. Under 
the auspices of the Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Foundation (AER), the Allen 
Consulting Group modelled three alternative scenarios for replacing the WET system 
with a volumetric tax: (i) replacing the WET with a volumetric tax set at a rate which 
does not alter the overall tax burden for wine producers ($13 per litre of pure alcohol); 
(ii) replacing the WET with the rate for full-strength draught beer; and (iii) replacing the 
WET with the rate for full-strength packaged beer (Allen Consulting Group, 2011). The 
key outcomes of each scenario are summarised below.
The retail price of cheap wine (i.e., cask wine) would increase under all three scenarios 
by 24.7 per cent, 76.7 per cent, and 114.6 per cent, respectively. Overall alcohol 
consumption would decline under each scenario by 4.9 million litres (2.6 per cent), 
12.9 million litres (6.8 per cent), and 16.3 million litres (61.2 per cent) of pure alcohol, 
respectively. Substitution with other alcoholic beverages would not offset the reduction 
in cask wine consumption; specifically, the level of switching from wine to other 
alcohol products was nil under scenario 1, and 2.8 million litres (22.6 per cent) and 4.7 
million litres (38 per cent) of pure alcohol under scenarios 2 and 3 respectively. Finally, 
scenarios 2 and 3 would generate additional taxation revenue of $900 million and $1.5 
billion, respectively.
A modelling analyses undertaken for the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation builds 
on the methodology used by Byrnes et al. (2010) to examine the cost effectiveness 
of 13 taxation reform scenarios (Doran et al., 2011). The findings suggest that all 13 
scenarios would save the government money and reduce alcohol-related harm. The 
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preferred scenario applied a universal tax rate on alcoholic beverages equivalent to a 
ten per cent increase in the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty 
free threshold of 1.15 per cent applied to all beverages bar spirits. The most effective 
scenario which meets NAAA principles of alcohol reform, was a two tiered tax system 
with first tier beverages (all beverages bar spirits and alcopops) attracting a volumetric 
tax that increases exponentially by ten per cent for every percentage point increase in 
alcohol content above 3.2 per cent and the second tier beverages (spirits and alcopops) 
attracting their current excise. 
There is evidence that the Australian government has had some success in curbing 
young people’s binge drinking with its 2008 increase in the tax on Ready-To-Drink 
(RTD) alcoholic beverages. This is discussed in more detail alongside international 
experiences of RTD in a later section. The Northern Territory’s (NT) Living with Alcohol 
(LWA) Beverage Levy and additional levy on cask wine represent Australian case studies 
of the possibilities of alcohol taxation reform.
The LWA program was introduced in 1992 and funded to 1997 by a levy on beverages 
with more than 3 per cent abv, which effectively raised the retail price of these 
beverages by 5 cents per standard drink. State taxes on beverages with 3 per cent abv or 
less were also reduced in 1992. From 1995 to 1997 the NT also imposed an additional 
levy on cask wine of $0.35/litre. The impact of both taxes was confounded by the LWA 
Program, which included education, controls on alcohol availability and expanded 
treatment and rehabilitation services, plus the 1995 reduction in the legal blood 
alcohol level (Chikritzhs, Stockwell & Pascal, 2005; Chikritzhs et al., 1999; Chikritzhs, 
Stockwell, Pascal, & Catalano, 2004).
The evaluation that provides the most compelling evidence, distinguishing between the 
effects of the taxes from the confounders and other economic factors, concluded that the 
LWA levy was responsible for reducing the number of acute deaths caused by alcohol-
attributable injury (for example assault, road injury, drowning). The levy may also have 
been implicated in the reduction in chronic alcohol-related disease, which was only 
observed after the levy was discontinued, although the program continued to operate 
(Chikritzhs et al., 2004; Chikritzhs et al., 2005). A review of the Chikritzhs et al. (2005) 
paper supports the findings of this evaluation, stressing the importance of the levy for the 
positive health outcomes (Holder, 2005).
An earlier study found that estimated per capita cask wine consumption (measured by 
licensee liquor purchases) decreased following the introduction of the cask wine levy 
and increased in the year following its removal, although not to pre-levy levels. They 
failed to find evidence of substitution into other alcoholic beverages (Gray, Chikritzhs, & 
Stockwell, 1999).
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The following passages highlight recent international (i.e., New Zealand, Europe, UK, 
Russia) alcohol taxation reforms and proposed policies. The Canadian and United 
States alcohol taxation systems are not considered because these countries operate 
different taxation arrangements at federal and state/province level, making it complex to 
calculate the combined tax.  We were informed by a reviewer that the results of a major 
comparative study of tax rates in Canada, USA and selected European countries, led by 
Professor William Kerr (Alcohol Research Group, Public Health Institute), is currently 
underway. In neither country has there been recent substantive reform to the taxation 
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system. Alcohol tax is collected at federal and state levels in the USA, with state level 
taxes varying markedly. Spirits are taxed more heavily than wine and beer (Chaloupka, 
2010). Alcohol is subject to a federal excise tax in Canada (Stockwell, Leng, & Sturge, 
2006). The excise rate is not indexed and has only been adjusted twice in the past 25 
years to compensate for changes to the GST13. The provinces have sales taxes and apply 
higher rates to alcohol than other goods and services. They can also apply special levies 
and taxes on alcoholic beverages (Stockwell et al., 2006).
New Zealand.  In New Zealand, alcohol beverages are subject to GST and an excise 
tax, which generally increases according to alcohol content. Low-alcohol content 
beverages ( ≤ 1.15 per cent abv) are exempt from tax but, unlike Australia, the first 1.15 
per cent abv of higher strength beer is taxed. Alcoholic beverages are taxed either by 
volume of alcohol or by volume of beverage. In large part, a two tier system operates, 
with one rate of duty for beer, wine and RTDs, and a higher rate for spirits and fortified 
wines (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). Specifically, beverages above 14 per cent 
abv are taxed at NZ$46.40 per litre of alcohol. Beer containing more than 2.5 per cent 
abv is taxed at NZ$26.021 per litre of alcohol. Most RTDs (6-9 per cent abv) are taxed 
at NZ$2.0816 per litre of beverage and non-fortified wines are taxed at NZ$2.0621 per 
litre of beverage14. RTDs (6-9 per cent abv) and most wines (12-14 per cent abv) are 
effectively taxed at a lower rate than beer. The threshold between these two different 
excise duties was originally set at 24 per cent abv but lowered to 14 per cent abv in 
2003 in light of concerns about the alcohol-related harms posed by low alcohol content 
spirits, including RTDs (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). Like Australia, tax rates 
are increased in line with inflation15.  
We have converted the tax rates to tax per standard Australian drink in Australian dollars 
(10 grams of alcohol) so as to compare the relativities in tax rates between different 
products in the two countries. The Australian tax on spirits is $0.92 per standard drink 
whereas the New Zealand equivalent is $0.47, using an Australian/New Zealand 
exchange rate of 1.25. Comparable figures for 4 per cent abv beer sold in bottle shops is 
$0.39 in Australia (42 per cent of the spirits rate) and $0.26 in New Zealand (55 per cent 
of the spirits rate), whereas beer of that strength sold on-trade is taxed similarly at the 
rates of $0.27 (29 per cent of the spirits rate) and $0.26 per standard drink respectively. 
A $10 bottle of 13 per cent abv wine is taxed at the rates of $0.19 (21 per cent of the 
spirits rate) and $0.16 (34 per cent of the spirits rate) per standard drink in Australia and 
New Zealand respectively. If the bottle of wine costs $40 there would be no change 
in the New Zealand tax rate, but the Australian tax rate would increase to $0.75 per 
standard drink (81 per cent of the spirits rate). Finally, a 6 per cent abv RTD is taxed at 
the spirits rate in Australia and at 75 per cent of the spirits rate in New Zealand ($0.35).
Following a recent review of New Zealand’s alcohol laws, the New Zealand Law 
Commission (2010) recommended that the excise tax rate be increased by 50 per cent 
(to effectively increase the price of alcohol by 10 per cent) and proposed eliminating 
excise duty on low-alcohol content products up to 2.5 per cent abv in order to 
encourage their consumption and production. 
Europe. The European Union (EU) currently comprises 27 Member States and a 
population of over 500 million people. Following several years over which a number 
of proposals were put forward to harmonise excise duties on alcoholic beverages, the 
EU agreed on two directives related to alcohol (i.e., Council Directives 92/83/EEC and 
92/83/EEC) and a single European Market came into effect in January 1993. The first 
Directive (92/83/EEC) provided instruction on how to define products and product 
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categories to be taxed, as well as setting out the principles of how the excise duties for 
these products should be levied. For example, still and sparkling wine are to be taxed 
at single rates per hectolitre of finished product, not in terms of alcohol content. The 
second Directive (92/84/EEC) provided a minimum excise duty rate for distilled spirits, 
beer and intermediate products such as fortified and liqueur wines (details of the specific 
excise duty rates are provided elsewhere; Cnossen, 2007). Notably, no minimum rate 
was set for wine. Member States retain sovereignty to set their own excise duty rates at 
or above these minimum thresholds. 
The EU’s strategy to support Member States in reducing alcohol-related harm was 
designed to “follow-up, assess and monitor developments and the measures taken 
in this field and to report back on the need for further actions” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006: 4). It focused on “preventing and cutting back heavy and 
extreme drinking patterns, as well as under-age drinking, and some of their most harmful 
consequences such as alcohol-related road accidents and Foetal Alcohol Syndrome” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 4). Notably, although the strategy 
acknowledges the handful of European countries that have increased taxes on products 
which they perceive to be particularly attractive to underage drinkers (e.g., alcopops), 
taxation is not included in the list of effective measures to curb underage drinking and 
reduce hazardous and harmful drinking among young people. Furthermore, taxation 
is not mentioned as an effective measure for preventing alcohol-related harm among 
adults.
Considerable variability exists in the excise duty rates across Member States for all 
alcoholic beverages, particularly for wine with some countries imposing an excise duty 
exceeding €1.50 on a bottle of wine and several others not imposing any excise duty 
(Rabinovich et al., 2009). Österberg (2011) suggests that differences in national interests 
are central to an understanding of disparities in excise duty rates across Europe. In 
countries such as France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Austria where wine growing and 
production is important and accounts for a considerable proportion of total agricultural 
output, excise duty level on wine has been based on an agricultural policy. Specifically, 
as part of the common agricultural policy in the EU, the excise duty on wine was kept 
very low, or even zero in some cases, to ensure the survival of small family wineries, 
a fair standard of living to wine farmers, and the supply of wine to consumers at 
reasonable prices (Österberg & Karlsson, 2002). In countries such as Sweden and 
Finland alcohol control measures have been motivated by social and public order 
and health policy concerns and accordingly relatively high taxes have been imposed 
on alcohol (Österberg, 2011; Österberg & Karlsson, 2002). Beyond these interests, 
alcohol taxation may be motivated by economic development interests such as ensuring 
alcohol-related employment and the interest of breweries and distilleries, and fiscal 
interest in generating revenue to finance the public sector (Österberg, 2011). 
Minimum excise duty rates, which came into force in 1993, have not changed in 
nominal terms since their introduction. As a consequence, the real value of the excise 
duty rates for most alcoholic beverages has decreased in the majority of Member States 
by approximately 30 per cent (Cnossen, 2007). For instance, a substantial decline in 
the real value of excise duty rates was observed in Ireland (taxation of beer and wine), 
Finland (taxation of beer and spirits), Denmark (taxation of spirits), and Sweden (taxation 
of wine) (Rabinovich et al., 2009). High taxation countries, such as Finland and Sweden, 
encountered pressure to reduce their alcohol excise duty rates following expansion 
of the single market and entry of low-taxation counties, such as Estonia, into the EU 
(Rabinovich et al., 2009). Increases in incomes as well as relatively stable alcohol prices 
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have contributed to alcohol becoming more affordable in most EU countries since 1996 
(Rabinovich et al., 2009).
There are several reasons behind the lack of adjustment in excise duty rates. Firstly, EU 
changes to taxes must be accepted unanimously by all Member States, which means 
that one Member State can veto proposals to increase minimum excise duty rates on 
alcohol. Secondly, the EU excise duty rate for wine is zero and wine-producing Member 
States have been unwilling to accept a positive excise duty rate for wine. Accordingly 
it has been difficult to argue that the excise duty for other alcohol products should be 
increased. Finally, in 2004, 10 countries joined the EU and, as part of their membership 
agreement, some were forced to increase their alcohol excise duty rates to the EU 
minimum standard; as a result they have been unwilling to accept any inflation-induced 
adjustments to the minimum rates that existed when they joined the EU (Österberg, 
2011).  
UK. The UK tax system comprises four separate regimes for beer, wine, spirits and cider. 
In 2010, similar to Australia, spirits attracted a constant tax per litre of pure alcohol 
content, as did beer over 1.2 per cent abv. Unlike Australia, but like New Zealand, the 
entire alcohol content of beer is taxed. The rate of tax on cider and wine increased with 
abv in alcohol strength ranges, although the duty rate is paid by volume so that within 
a strength range, the tax per litre of alcohol falls. By way of illustration, spirits with an 
abv of 37.5%, were taxed most heavily (£23.80/litre of pure alcohol), the analogous tax 
on wine with an abv of 12.5 per cent was £18, while beer with an abv of 4.2 per cent 
attracted a tax of £17.32, and cider with an abv of 4.5 per cent only attracted a £8 tax 
(Hunt et al., 2011). 
A number of recent changes in UK alcohol excise duties are of particular interest. As 
mentioned earlier, in their 2010 manifesto the Coalition Government pledged to review 
alcohol taxation to target problem drinking without penalising responsible drinkers. In 
the March 2011 Budget (HM Treasury, 2011), Chancellor George Osborne confirmed 
that the Coalition Government would continue plans inherited from the Labour 
Government to increase alcohol duty at 2 per cent above inflation every year until 
2014-15. This so-called alcohol duties escalator amounts to a 7.2 per cent increase 
in alcohol duty in the 2011 Budget. For consumers, this equates to an extra £0.04 
imposed on a pint of beer, £0.15 on a bottle of wine, and £0.54 on a bottle of spirits. 
These changes came into effect on 28th March 2011 and followed a 26.1 per cent rise in 
alcohol duty since March 2008 (when the alcohol duties escalator was first introduced) 
and increases in VAT to 20 per cent in January 2011. The move to retain the alcohol 
duties escalator was greeted by disapproval by the beer and pub industry16. Before the 
introduction of the duty escalator, alcohol duties in the UK (particularly on spirits) had 
been falling in real terms (Griffith & Leicester, 2010).
In September 2010 the definition of cider was amended so that greater duty was levied 
on cheap, higher-strength ciders17. As a complement, an alcohol taxation review in 
November 2010 (HM Treasury, 2010) announced Government plans to increase the 
duty on high-strength beers and lower the rate of duty on lower-strength beers in a bid 
to encourage production and consumption of the latter. Specifically, as detailed in the 
March 2011 Budget, a £0.25 increase will be imposed on beers over 7.5 per cent abv 
and a lower rate of 50 per cent of general beer duty will be imposed on beers <=2.8 per 
cent abv (HM Treasury, 2011). These changes will come into effect from October 2011. 
Whilst welcomed as a positive step in reducing alcohol-related illnesses, Professor Ian 
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Gilmore, chair of the Alcohol Health Alliance and former President of the Royal College 
of Physicians (Alcohol Committee), argues that this policy doesn’t go far enough and that 
attention should be focused on beers and lagers over 5 per cent abv18. Indeed, given that 
high-strength beers (exceeding 7.5 per cent abv) account for less than 1 per cent of total 
beer sales in the UK, this measure may have little impact19. 
The Treasury’s alcohol taxation review concluded that taxing alcoholic beverages based 
on their alcohol content alone would require significant change to the extant duty 
system and that increasing the tax rates on cider, beer and wine to levels consistent 
with the tax rate on spirits would penalise responsible drinkers, and may not facilitate 
their wider objective of reducing problem drinking. The review noted evidence that 
spirits comprise a greater proportion of alcohol consumed by heavier drinkers, younger 
drinkers (aged 18-34 years) and on occasions when large amounts of alcohol are 
consumed (HM Treasury, 2010). 
Russia. Russia boasts one of the world’s highest alcohol consumption rates and 
alcohol-related harm is one of the country’s leading causes of death (Zaridze et al., 
2009). In response, the Kremlin has undertaken a rigorous anti-alcohol campaign in 
recent years in a bid to curb excessive drinking. In January 2010, the excise duty on 
beer increased by 200 per cent. As a result of the excise tax increase and rising raw 
material costs, Russian beer consumption indexed a 1 per cent decline in the first half 
of 2011 and 2 per cent in the second quarter (Hansen, 2011). Amid growing concerns 
about the widespread availability of beer and resultant risk posed to underage drinkers 
(Osborn, 2011), President Medvedev signed a bill officially classifying beer as an alcohol 
beverage in July 2011. Prior to this, all beverages with less than 10% pure alcohol were 
labelled a foodstuff.  The new measures will come into force in 201320. As part of the 
campaign to reduce excessive drinking, Russia also introduced minimum prices for 
alcohol; this will be discussed in further detail later. 
In April 2011 the Russian Finance Ministry announced proposals to increase the excise 
tax on alcohol by 20 per cent from 1st January 2012, followed by further increases on 
1st July 2012, and January 2013 and 2014. This would see the excise tax for a half-
litre of vodka rise from the current price of 46.2 roubles ($1.6) to 180 roubles ($6.1). 
However, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has criticised the proposed increase in excise 
tax, arguing that it will not reduce the country’s high alcohol consumption levels and 
instead foster the growth of black market substitutes and moonshine production21.  Black 
market substitutes and moonshine already represents a major public health problem 
in Russia, contributing to hospitalisations and death due to cardiovascular disease, 
poisoning, and liver diseases (Bobrova et al., 2009; Lachenmeier, Rehm, & Gmel, 2007).
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POLICY 2.  SPECIAL/ADDITIONAL TAXATION - 
ALCOPOPS TAX
Alcopops, otherwise referred to as RTDs, are (typically) spirit-based beverages that are 
premixed with a soft drink. Their sweet taste, pleasant flavouring as well as attractive 
design and advertising make them especially appealing to young people (Metzner & 
Kraus, 2008). In recent years, growing concern about young people’s drinking and 
increasing popularity of alcopops among younger drinkers has led several countries to 
impose special taxes on these drinks. The following section will review these national 
and international policy efforts.
AUSTRALIA
Since their introduction to the Australian market in the mid-1980s, alcopops have 
fluctuated in taxation levels. Briefly, prior to July 2000 alcopops were taxed in line with 
full-strength spirits; from July 2000 to April 2008, alcopops were taxed equivalently to 
full-strength packaged beer (but without the 1.15 per cent abv excise-free threshold) 
as part of the new tax system; in late April 2008, the tax on spirit-based alcopops 
was increased back in line with full-strength bottled spirits and, wine and beer-based 
alcopops were taxed at the same rate in 2009 (Distilled Spirits Industry Council 
Australia, 2011). The taxation increase is the focus of this section.
Amid concerns that alcopops were contributing to a ‘binge drinking’ culture, the Rudd 
Government announced a $53.5 million National Binge Drinking Campaign targeting 
young adults in March 2008. As part of this strategy, the federal Health and Ageing 
Minister (Hon Nicola Roxon) increased the tax rate on spirit-based alcopops by 70 
per cent the following month, amounting to a price increase of $0.45 for an ‘average’ 
alcopop (Jones & Barrie, 2011). The tax increase led to two Senate Inquiries (Australian 
Senate, 2008, 2009a) and criticism was levied by sections of the alcohol industry, 
the federal opposition, and some independent senators against the tax. In particular, 
arguments centred on the possibility that consumers would substitute alcopops with 
cheaper forms of alcohol or drugs and the federal opposition argued (at least initially) 
that that the move amounted to a ‘tax grab’ to raise government revenue (Distilled Spirits 
Industry Council of Australia, 2011; Doran & Shakeshaft, 2008; Fogarty & Chapman, 
in press). Though the tax was introduced in April 2008, the supporting legislation was 
blocked by a single vote in the Senate in March 2009, but was finally passed in August 
2009, making the tax increase permanent. 
So what impact has the alcopops tax increase had? In general, it appears that the 
increase led to an immediate reduction in alcopops sales; however, there is evidence 
of some substitution with other alcoholic beverages and the most recent sales data 
suggests that the downward correction may be over. As Skov et al. (2011: 84) remind us 
“the simplicity of these before-and-after analyses and the lack of comparison to other 
populations limit the conclusions that can be drawn.” Some potential confounding 
factors include the GFC, adaptive marketing by the alcohol industry, the federal 
government’s national binge drinking strategy and associated advertising campaign, as 
well as general media reporting of these issues (Doran & Digiusto, in press). To date, no 
analyses of the effect of the alcopops tax has accounted for the potential confounders.
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Monthly sales data of packaged alcohol (sold for off-licence consumption by licensees 
across Australia’s mainland states) from the Nielsen Liquor Services Group indicated 
a decline in alcopops sales in the three months following the introduction of the tax 
in April 2008. Specifically, 91 million fewer standard drinks were sold as alcopops 
compared to the same period in the previous year. Although an increase in spirits and 
beer sales was observed, this only amounted to one half of the reduction in alcopops 
sales (Chikritzhs et al., 2009). The Australian Tax Office (ATO) similarly observed a 54 
per cent decline in alcopops sales and a 7 per cent increase in spirit sales from April to 
June 2008 (Chikritzhs et al., 2009). 
Based on average weekly clearance data from the ATO and Australia Customs Services 
data on excisable alcohol sales (notably excluding wine), alcopops sales in litres of 
pure alcohol (from May 2008 to March 2009) declined by 35 per cent over sales in the 
previous year and total spirits sales decreased by 8 per cent. During the same period, 
sales of full-strength spirits increased by 18 per cent and beer by 5 per cent, indicating 
evidence of substitution to other alcoholic beverages. In total, sales decreased by 
0.5 per cent compared to positive growth rates observed in earlier years (Australian 
Government, 2009). 
Based on sales data compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, annual per 
capita consumption of spirits fell by 0.22 litres (10 per cent) in 2008-09; per capita 
consumption of alcopops fell by 0.35 litres (over 30 per cent) with some substitution 
into other spirits indicated by a 0.13 litre increase (11 per cent). In 2009-10 there was 
a further 0.04 litre reduction (2 per cent) in per capita consumption of spirits due to a 
continued decline in alcopops consumption. It seems clear that the 2008-09 reduction 
in spirits consumption resulted from the tax increase. It translated to a 0.16 litre 
reduction in per capita consumption of all alcohol, with beer consumption remaining 
at much the same level as it had been for the past four years and per capita wine 
consumption increasing by 0.07 litres, an increase not inconsistent with trend. However, 
the 2009-10 decline in spirits consumption coincided with a 0.18 litre reduction in 
beer consumption. Overall, alcohol consumption declined by 0.15 litres, since wine 
consumption experienced continued growth of 0.9 litres per capita (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011a).
Doran and Digiusto (in press) analysed alcohol sales data from 2004 and 2009, 
gathered by Euromonitor International (i.e., an independent organisation which provides 
comprehensive coverage on consumer markets across the globe). These data facilitate 
more fine-tuned analyses of substitution trends. Per capita spirit-based alcopops 
consumption increased every year from 2004 to 2007, but decreased in 2008 and 2009 
following the introduction of the alcopops tax increase. Total alcohol consumption per 
capita followed a similar path, rising from 11.52 litres in 2004 to 11.79 litres in 2007; 
and subsequently declining to 11.55 litres in 2008 and 11.41 litres in 2009. The authors 
found that per capita consumption of wine and beer remained relatively stable over the 
period in question. Wine-based RTDs, spirits and cider experienced some growth but 
the authors concluded that their increased consumption in 2008 and 2009 could be 
interpreted either as evidence of substitution or a continuation of long-term trends. 
The most recent Euromonitor International data on alcopops sales suggests that the 
downward correction in alcopops consumption may be over, with alcopops volume 
sales increasing in 2010 by approximately 2 per cent (indexing 323 million litres), 
albeit a level well below its pre-alcopops tax increase status. Whilst subject to various 
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situational factors, further growth in alcopops volume sales is predicted for 2010-2015. 
The release of a range of alcopops onto the market (discussed further below), such as 
Beam Global’s low carbonate alcopops, which attract less tax due to their relatively 
low levels of alcohol content, may have partially contributed to the positive growth 
of alcopops (Euromonitor International, 2011a). Almost all RTDs sold in Australia are 
produced locally and the market is dominated by three producers: Diageo Australia, 
Beam Global and Independent Distillers. In 2010, 30 per cent of sales were made by 
Diageo Australia, whose RTD products include Bundaberg rum-based RTDs and UDLs22 
(Euromonitor International, 2011a). According to Diageo’s recent annual reports, the 
impact of the alcopops tax was most apparent in the 2008-09 financial year when 
Australian RTD net sales23 fell by 23%. For Diageo Australia, this reduction in net sales 
was partially offset by a 13 per cent increase in net sales of spirits. Their 2009-10 5 per 
cent decline in net sales of RTDs was purportedly the result of increased competition in 
the RTD sector (Diageo, 2010, 2011).
Although alcohol sales data are a better indicator of alcohol consumption at the 
population level (Stockwell et al., 2008), self-report consumption data can be indicative 
of change within sub-populations of interest. Roy Morgan Research examined alcohol 
consumption trends among adults aged over 18 years across Australia over 2007 and 
2008 for the Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia (DSICA). They found that 
total alcohol consumption amongst those aged 18-24 years increased in the 2008 July-
December period compared to the 2007 July-December period; this trend was observed 
for both males and females. Furthermore, whilst total alcopops consumption decreased 
in the 2008 July-December period compared to the 2007 July-December period, this 
was due to declines in consumption amongst older age groups not amongst those aged 
18-24 years (Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia, 2009b).   
Data collected from Victorian secondary school students (aged 12-17 years) suggests that 
between surveys in 2005 and 2008 there were reductions in the proportions of students 
who reported drinking recently (in the week preceding the survey) and at risky or 
high-risk levels (Skov et al., 2011). Over the same period there were no changes in the 
drinking patterns of those who reported drinking recently and recent drinkers were no 
less likely to cite RTDs as their preferred drink and no more likely to prefer beer or wine 
(White & Smith, 2009).
Industry response. The alcohol industry opposed the special tax on alcopops arguing 
that it was a tax grab rather than a health measure. For instance, the Distilled Spirits 
Industry Council of Australia (2009a) submitted a document to the Senate Standing 
Committee on Community Affairs, outlining their opposition to the tax. They argued that 
the alcopops tax increase was unpopular among consumers; economically unworkable 
(e.g., flaws on the part of the Treasury in estimating the budget required for the tax 
measure); and amounted to a social and health failure (e.g., government ignored 
evidence that isolated tax measures have limited effectiveness in reducing excessive 
alcohol consumption and evidence of substitution). Indeed, in mid-2008 this industry 
organisation launched an anti-alcopops tax website (http://www.alcotaxripoff.com; link 
is no longer active) which included a revenue counter displaying how much money the 
government was recouping. 
The alcohol industry sought to undermine the tax through advertising campaigns 
encouraging consumers to ‘beat the alcopops meanies’ by buying bottles of straight 
spirits and mixing them with free bottles of Coke (Australian Senate, 2009b). For 
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example, the Thirsty Camel Bottleshops ran a newspaper and website campaign with 
the	slogan	‘Free	coke	with	JD	and	SC	–	that’s	cool!’	The	campaign	was	argued	to	be	in	
violation of the Alcohol Beverages Advertising Code and an example of “a particularly 
cynical response to the Government’s ‘alcopops’ tax” 24. Moreover, soon after the 
alcopops tax was introduced, alcopops manufacturers produced ‘malternatives’ such as 
Smirnoff Platinum and Bolt (i.e., alcopops with a beer-base rather than spirit-base) and 
‘wine-pops’ (i.e., alcopops with a wine-base) to circumvent the alcopops tax. The move 
was criticized by the WFA and the Australasian Associated Brewers25. Consequently, in 
late 2009 the Rudd Government closed the alcopops tax loophole so that beer-based26 
and wine-based27 products that mimic spirit-based RTDs were taxed equivalently.
The Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia (2011) outlines evidence to support 
their claim that the alcopops tax failed. For instance, it points to research suggesting 
that, contrary to the Rudd Government’s justification of an alcopop tax, alcopops are 
not disproportionately associated with risky and high-risk drinking (e.g., Henry Review, 
2010; HM Treasury, 2010; Metnzer & Kraus, 2008). In addition, they highlight evidence 
of public dissatisfaction with the tax increase (e.g., Aussies Against the Alcohol Tax 
Increase [AATATI], public opinion polls, media editorials). Finally, they note that there is 
no evidence that the alcopops tax increase was associated with reductions in alcohol-
related hospitalisations and that the measure failed to generate as much revenue as 
initially forecasted. 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Beyond Australia, the excise duty on spirit-based alcopops was increased in Germany in 
2004, in Luxembourg in 2002, and in Switzerland in 2004; Denmark levied additional 
duty on spirit-based RTDs in 2005; and France doubled the tax on spirit-based RTDs 
in 200428. Additionally, spirit-based alcopops were taxed at an equivalent rate to 
spirits in the UK (during 2002), Ireland (during 2003), and some US states including 
Maine (during 2005), California (in 2008), and Utah (during 2008). Where evidence is 
available, findings are mixed regarding the effectiveness of the higher alcopops taxation 
rates on levels of alcohol consumption. 
For instance, the German Federal Centre for Health Education examined alcohol 
consumption among German teenagers aged 12-17 years between 2004 and 2007. 
Their findings indicated that while an initial decline occurred in consumption following 
the introduction of the tax increase in August 2004, total alcohol consumption increased 
by 2007. Overall, teenagers’ average weekly consumption of alcohol decreased from 
44.2g in 2004 to 34.1g in 2005, but subsequently increased to 50.4g in 2007. More 
specifically, between 2004 and 2007 weekly consumption of spirit-based RTDs and 
wine/sparkling wine declined whilst consumption of all other alcoholic beverages such 
as beer, spirits and cocktails increased (Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia, 
2009a).  
Müller, Piontek, Pabst, Baumeister, and Kraus (2010) similarly examined the impact of 
the alcopops tax on consumption and beverage preference of adolescents aged 12-17 
years in Germany using cross-sectional data from the European School Survey Project 
on Alcohol and other Drugs. The authors observed an increase in spirits consumption 
alongside a decline in alcopops consumption which, as Doran and Digiusto (in press) 
suggest, may represent a partial substitution effect or an underlying trend. It should also 
be noted that methodological weaknesses have been highlighted with the Müller et al. 
study elsewhere in the literature (Wagenaar, 2010).   
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In February 2004, Switzerland introduced a 300 per cent tax increase on alcopops. 
Alcopops sales appeared to decline considerably following the tax increase (Wicki et al., 
2006). Indeed recent data from Euromonitor International reports indicates that alcopops 
sales decreased in 2006 and 2007 due to the resultant higher prices and negative image; 
however, this trend reversed in 2008 with further growth evident in 2009 and 2010. In 
particular, while spirit-based alcopops appear to have gradually declined, wine- and 
beer-based alcopops increased in popularity and contributed to overall growth. In 
2010, alcopops experienced growth in total volume sales of approximately 2 per cent 
(Euromonitor International, 2011b).
New Zealand Law Commission (2010) is a review of the country’s extant alcohol 
legislation, published in May 2010, which includes a number of recommendations on 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies currently being considered by the government. 
While the Commission shared the wider public’s concerns about excessive consumption 
of alcohol products such as RTDs, they concluded that there was insufficient evidence 
supporting a higher excise tax on RTDs. They cautioned that such a tax could lead to 
substitution to full-strength spirits and self-mixing of spirit-based drinks, in addition to 
the development of other alcohol products targeting young drinkers. In any case, they 
also noted that, within the context of price per standard drink, spirits, beer and wine are 
all substantially cheaper than RTDs. 
In the UK, the government recently decided against an increase in RTD taxes, citing 
evidence of the marked reduction in consumption of RTDs between 2001 and 2008; 
lack of support for the contention that RTDs are disproportionately responsible for 
alcohol-related harms; and observation that while young adults (18-24 years) and 
hazardous drinkers were the main consumers of RTDs, most of the alcohol consumed by 
men and women was beer and wine, respectively (HM Treasury, 2010).
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POLICY 3. MINIMUM PRICING OF ALCOHOL 
As outlined above, taxation has been widely used both nationally and internationally 
as a policy lever for influencing the price of alcohol. Interest in minimum pricing as a 
complementary policy for reducing excessive alcohol consumption has gained traction 
in recent years, particularly in the UK. Specifically, minimum pricing sets a floor price 
per unit of pure alcohol (UK definition) or per standard drink (Australian definition) 
below which it would be illegal to sell alcohol. 
A floor price ensures that a minimum pricing policy cannot be circumvented or 
undermined by adaptive marketing, deep discounting, and below-cost sale strategies 
(Hunt et al., 2011; Rabinovich et al., 2009). Adaptive marketing strategies have been 
frequently employed to undermine alcohol taxation. For example, following the 
introduction of the special tax on spirit-based alcopops in Australia in April 2008, the 
alcohol industry developed beer-based alcopops (e.g., Smirnoff Platinum) to circumvent 
the tax increase (Rolfe, 2009) and low carbonate and low alcohol content alcopops to 
reduce the tax component (Euromonitor International, 2011a). Furthermore, as discussed 
in the ‘Special/additional tax - alcopops tax’ section earlier, the alcohol industry 
undermined the alcopops tax through the promotion of spirits and free soft drinks. In a 
similar vein, loss-leading (or below-cost sales) strategies are frequently used in the off-
trade, particularly by large alcohol retailers such as supermarkets. The Henry Review 
acknowledged that while volumetric taxation would provide a floor price for alcohol, 
alcohol can still be sold below cost or given away (Henry Review, 2010: 440).
Bans on below-cost sales are difficult to monitor and enforce due to difficulties in 
defining what constitutes ‘cost’ (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010; Roberts, 2011). In 
general, below-cost sales have been defined as selling a product below the cost of duty 
plus VAT or, if one were to be conservative, production, distribution and marketing costs 
would also be factored in (Hunt et al., 2011). Below-cost sales are a prominent feature 
of the Australian and EU markets. For instance, in March 2011 Australia’s largest brewer, 
Foster’s, withheld supplies of beer to Coles and Woolworths after reports emerged 
that the supermarkets planned to sell beer below-cost price. The supermarkets, which 
collectively control approximately 50 per cent of Australia’s alcohol distribution, were 
allegedly planning to sell 24 Victoria Bitter stubbies for $28 (i.e., $1.10 per standard 
drink; 4.6 per cent alcohol and 375ml stubbies), which normally have a wholesale price 
of $33 and retail for $38 (Ferguson, 2011). Loss leading is not restricted to beer sales. In 
June 2011, a Western Australia parliamentary committee report highlighted the case of 
a regional Woolworths Dan Murphy store selling a bottle of wine for $1.95 (or $1.85 
if purchased as part of a dozen bottles) (i.e., $0.33 per standard drink; 12.5 per cent 
alcohol and 750ml) (Education and Health Standing Committee, 2011). 
In terms of the UK, a Competition Commission inquiry found that ten leading 
supermarkets reported engaging in below-cost sales, with such practices ranging from 
eight to 25 weeks in duration and accounting for approximately 3 per cent of total 
revenue (Competition Commission, 2007). In fact, the total value of below-cost sales 
of alcohol during the 2006 football World Cup by five leading UK supermarkets was 
approximately £38.6 million (Competition Commission, 2008). 
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WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR MINIMUM PRICING? 
In 2008 the Ukraine introduced minimum pricing and, in 2010, Russia, Uzbekistan, 
and the Republic of Moldova followed suit. For example, on 1st January 2010 Russia 
introduced a minimum price of 89 roubles ($3) for a half-litre bottle of vodka, which 
was subsequently increased to 98 rubles on 1st January 2011. Before minimum pricing, a 
half-litre of vodka sold for approximately 40 rubles. The Russian Finance Ministry have 
proposed increasing the minimum price of a half-litre bottle of vodka to 200 rubles by 
2013. In June 2010, minimum pricing was introduced for alcoholic beverages greater 
than or equal to 28 per cent abv (Jargin, 2011). On 1st January 2011, a minimum price 
was introduced for brandy. The wholesale price of the cheapest half-litre bottle of 
brandy is 165-175 rubles, with a final retail price of minimum of 190-210 rubles29.
In Canada, minimum pricing is commonly referred to as ‘social reference pricing’ and 
is in place in eight of the 10 provinces (i.e., Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, 
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, and 
Saskatchewan), with prices varying between provinces. Despite being in place since 
the 1990s, there are no published evaluations regarding the effectiveness of the policy 
currently available. We understand however that research evaluating minimum pricing 
regulations in four of the Canadian provinces is currently underway by Professor Tim 
Stockwell and colleagues30. 
MODELLING ANALYSES IN ABSENCE OF AN  
EVIDENCE BASE
Much of the research and campaign for minimum pricing has been based in the UK. In 
2008, the UK Department of Health commissioned a team of researchers at Sheffield 
University to systemically review the impact of a range of alcohol pricing policies on 
alcohol consumption and related harms (Meier et al., 2010; Purshouse et al., 2010). 
Analyses focused on the population as a whole and particularly on three groups of 
concern: underage drinkers, 18-24 year old binge drinkers, and harmful drinkers. 
Sophisticated economic-epidemiological modelling analyses revealed that very low 
thresholds would have minimal impact but effectiveness rapidly increased between 
thresholds of £0.40 and £0.70 per unit of alcohol (Purshouse et al., 2010). According to 
Meier et al. (2010), a £0.50 minimum price per unit of alcohol would result in a 6.9 per 
cent reduction in consumption in the population as a whole. Hazardous and harmful 
drinkers tend to pay less per unit of alcohol than moderate drinkers. Men’s consumption 
is affected less than women’s unless the minimum price is directed at beer or a higher 
(more meaningful) minimum price is applied to on-trade sales. Young hazardous 
drinkers are more affected by on-trade minimum pricing. Based on these findings, Liam 
Donaldson the Chief Medical Officer for England in 2009 (Department of Health, 2008) 
predicted that over 10 years a £0.50 minimum price per unit of alcohol would result 
annually in 3,393 fewer deaths, 45,800 fewer crimes, 97,900 fewer hospital admissions, 
and 296,900 fewer sick days; ultimately saving over £1 billion. 
Approximately two-thirds of the total volume of pure alcohol was sold through off-trade 
sales in Scotland during 2010 (Robinson, Craig, McCartney, & Beeston, 2011a) and in 
England and Wales in 2009 (Robinson, Catto, Beeston, & Gruer, 2011b), compared to 
one third sold through the on-trade. More specifically, in England and Wales, of the 
proportion of alcohol sold through the off-trade, 16 per cent of off-trade alcohol was 
sold below £0.30 per unit; 48 per cent was sold below £0.40 per unit; 76 per cent was 
sold below £0.50 per unit; and 88 per cent was sold below £0.60 per unit (Robinson 
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et al., 2011b). In Scotland, 10.8 per cent of off-trade alcohol was sold below £0.30 per 
unit;	45.3	per	cent	was	sold	below	£0.40	per	unit;	73.4	per	cent	was	sold	below	£0·50	
per	unit;	and	87.2	per	cent	was	sold	below	£0·60	per	unit	(Robinson	et	al.,	2011a).	
On average, the price per unit was £0.45 through off-trade sales and £1.34 through 
on-trade sales, meaning that if minimum unit pricing were to be introduced it would 
have a greater impact on off-trade sales (Robinson et al., 2011a). As Robinson et al. 
(2011a) point out, if minimum pricing was introduced, it would be necessary to examine 
changes in alcohol prices (which products were affected and by how much) and 
disposable incomes to determine whether they contribute to the impact of a minimum 
price per unit on consumption and related harms. 
MINIMUM PRICING DISCUSSIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
In early June 2011, the Australian media reported that the federal government were 
considering implementing a nationwide minimum price per standard drink (Martin 
2011a, 2011b). Specifically, based on a report by the National Preventative Health 
Taskforce (2009), the Australian National Preventative Health Agency was federally 
established on 1st January 2011 with one of its mandates to develop the concept of 
minimum pricing by 2012. The federal Health Minister, Nicola Roxon, indicated that 
whilst important, it is a preliminary step and the proposals would have to be considered 
by all states and territories. 
In Australia, discussion and calls for minimum pricing have been voiced in the 
Northern Territory for some time. Internationally, the campaign for minimum pricing 
gathered pace and renewed relevance following publication of the modelling analyses 
undertaken by academics at Sheffield University (discussed above under the ‘Modelling 
analyses in absence of an evidence base’ section).
SUPPORT FOR MINIMUM PRICING IN AUSTRALIA 
Australian advocates of minimum pricing include the NAAA, Cancer Council Australia, 
Australian Hotels Association, and National Preventative Health Taskforce. In addition, 
the Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social 
Justice Commissioner Mick Gooda, Greens Senator for Western Australia, Rachel 
Siewert, and Dr John Boffa from the Alice Springs People’s Alcohol Action Collation 
have lobbied in favour of the policy. Dr Boffa has endorsed a minimum price of $1.20 
per Australian standard drink; this is equivalent to £0.64 per UK unit of alcohol31.
In December 2010, the Territory’s Chief Minister Paul Henderson indicated he was 
willing to consider introducing minimum pricing (McNally, 2010). However, in 
April 2011 he stated that its implementation was not feasible due to the 1997 High 
Court ruling whereby states and territories of Australia were no longer afforded the 
constitutional power to raise alcohol taxes, assigning power instead to the federal 
government. In response, Dr John Boffa argued that since minimum pricing is not a tax it 
could be implemented by states and territories (Raper, 2011).
In late June 2011, Australia’s leading supermarket chains publicly backed minimum 
pricing. Specifically, Coles pledged that they would sell a bottle of wine for at least $8 
(previously wine sold for as little as $4.99) and would no longer stock two-litre casks 
in any of their Alice Springs stores from 1st July 2011. This move effectively sets a floor 
price of $1.14 per standard drink. Woolworths quickly followed suit, announcing 
they would no longer sell two-litre casks in their Alice Springs stores. Previously these 
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drinks retailed for $12.99 ($0.62 per standard drink) in Woolworths and $10.99 (less 
than $0.50 per standard drink) in Coles (Martin & Rosenberg, 2011). IGA have already 
trialled a minimum price of $1.15 per standard drink in one of their Alice Springs stores 
and are considering extending the price to their remaining stores in the town (Martin & 
Rosenberg, 2011). They also announced that they would no longer stock two-litre casks 
(Byrne, 2011). As discussed in detail below, the Northern Territory Licensing Commission 
extended the ban sales of four- and five-litre cask wine to Darwin, Palmerston and rural 
regions in 2010. These are areas that were not previously covered by the ban; the ban 
now covers all major townships and regions in the Territory32.
At the time of writing, three alcohol outlets in Alice Springs (i.e. Piggly Wiggly’s, Todd 
Tavern, and Gap View Hotel) had yet to follow the lead of the big supermarkets, and 
reports suggest that the Territory Government would prefer a federal volumetric taxation 
approach (Byrne, 2011). Similarly, the Alice Springs town council voted five votes to 
three to ask the supermarkets to discard these plans (Martin, 2011c). 
PROXY MINIMUM PRICING RESTRICTIONS IN AUSTRALIA
In the Northern Territory, alcohol consumption exceeds the national average; it is 
estimated that if the Northern Territory were a country, it would boast the second 
highest rate of per capita alcohol consumption in the world (South Australian Centre for 
Economic Studies, 2009). Excessive consumption of cask wine is a particular concern 
in the Northern Territory as well as in Western Australia. Cask wine is an Australian 
invention which appeared on the domestic market during the early 1970s (Stockwell & 
Crosbie, 2001). Cask wine is sold as cheaply as $0.30 per standard drink, not only in the 
Northern Territory but also Australia-wide (based on authors’ own calculations of cask 
wine prices Australia-wide).
In response to concerns about cask wine consumption, several remote and regional 
Australian communities (some of which have large Aboriginal populations, such as 
Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory and Derby in Western Australia) have restricted 
the sale of large wine casks. Often in tandem with other restrictions on alcohol (e.g., 
limiting of take away sales to certain times of the day), this measure has typically 
involved bans on the sale of four- and five-litre wine casks and limits on the sales of two-
litre wine casks (National Drug Research Institute, 2007). A comprehensive review of 
the evaluations associated with these interventions is provided elsewhere (see National 
Drug Research Institute, 2007). Briefly, this evaluation highlighted three instances 
where it was possible to adequately distinguish between the effects of restricting the 
sales of wine casks and other restrictions (i.e., Tennant Creek and Alice Springs in the 
Northern Territory, and Newman in Western Australia). In these instances, there was 
clear evidence of the ability of this proxy control on minimum prices to reduce per 
capita consumption of alcohol and associated harms, despite some substitution into 
other alcoholic beverages (see National Drug Research Institute, 2007). At present, the 
effectiveness of the price-based restrictions is being systematically evaluated in a major 
independent evaluation by the National Drug Research Institute.
It is worth noting measures taken by the alcohol industry to undermine the cask-wine 
restrictions. For example, in Alice Springs, alcohol retailers introduced cheap port in 
two-litre casks following the ban on the sale of wine in containers greater than two litres. 
Similarly in Newman, the sale of 1.5 litre plastic bottles of port effectively circumvented 
the restriction on the sale of port in two-litre casks of fortified wine (National Drug 
Research Institute, 2007).
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MINIMUM PRICING PROPOSALS IN THE UK
During the late 1990’s, devolved government was introduced in the UK. Specifically, 
whilst the Westminster government retains sovereignty on national policy matters such 
as taxation, the National Assemblies (or Executives) for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are able to pass laws in specific fields. Arrangements in the three devolved 
administrations vary, reflecting their different histories and administrative structures33. 
Before discussing the minimum pricing proposals considered by these regional 
governments, attention will focus on interest in minimum pricing at the local authority 
level (i.e., Oldham, Greater Manchester, Middlesbrough, Wirral, Newcastle, and 
Cheshire East). 
UK local authority level. Oldham. In 2009, Oldham, a borough in Greater 
Manchester, was labelled the ‘binge drinking capital of Britain’ in a series of national 
media reports. For instance, Yorkshire Street (the main drinking area) reported a 200 per 
cent increase in serious violent incidents during the first four months of 2009 (Bilton, 
2009a). In response, Oldham council reviewed the licences of 22 bars and clubs in 
the town centre and passed a bylaw in August 2009 whereby premises wishing to sell 
alcohol below £0.75 per unit of alcohol had to adopt a series of measures. Specifically, 
customers were prohibited from standing near the bar and instead had to queue one 
at a time in a post office style queuing system and, when at the bar, could only buy 
a maximum of two drinks per round (whilst supervised by extra door staff and police 
officers). Those bars or clubs which refused to follow the council’s conditions faced 
losing their licence. Most venues accepted the conditions (Bilton, 2009b). As a result 
of the policy, violent night-time crime dropped by 27 per cent in the town centre and 
figures from the Greater Manchester Police indicated a 63 per cent decline in serious 
violent crime and 28 per cent drop in serious crime during the 2009 Christmas period 
(Foottit, 2010). More recent statistics indicate that violent crime dropped from 24 
incidents per month in 2008 to 18 incidents per month in 2010 (Reed, 2011). The 
council targeted off-trade premises in November 2009 and invited 15 supermarkets to 
adopt a series of measures regarding promotional selling of alcohol below £0.50 per 
unit34 (see Ban on discounts and promotions for more).
Greater Manchester. In November 2010, the Association of Greater Manchester 
Authorities (AGMA), which comprises 10 councils making up Greater Manchester, 
drafted a bylaw to impose a minimum price of £0.50 per unit on all drinks sold across 
the city and surrounding suburbs (as well as a ban on pub loyalty-card schemes)35. 
This would mean that a bottle of wine would cost a minimum of £4.50 and a two-litre 
of cider would cost £5.50 (Linton, 2010). The measure is estimated to save the health 
service sector £1.375 billion per annum over 10 years. Those failing to comply with 
the proposed rules could face a fine of £500. The UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
signalled support for the measure indicating that such efforts would be looked upon 
“very sympathetically” (Tapsfield, 2010).  At the time of writing, not all of the 10 
councils had agreed to the bylaw (Mathieson, 2011). 
Middlesbrough. Middlesbrough boasts one of the highest levels of alcohol-related 
health problems among those aged under 19 years in England. Following a consultation 
period, Middlesbrough Council approved a licensing policy in January 2011 for 2011-
2014 that will encourage all licensed premises to impose a minimum unit price of £0.50 
on all alcoholic beverages36. If a premise sells alcohol below this threshold their licence 
will be reviewed. 
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Wirral. Proposals to introduce minimum pricing in Wirral (a borough in Liverpool) were 
defeated37 in early 2011.  
Newcastle. At the time of writing, councillors in Newcastle were lobbying for the 
introduction of minimum pricing across the North East of England (Pearson, 2011). 
Cheshire East. In April 2011, Cheshire East Council agreed to minimum pricing in 
principle and the drafting of a bylaw in conjunction with neighbouring authorities. At 
the time of writing, the bylaw was drafted and being considered by the chief executives 
of the three respective authorities with a view to implementation in early 2012 (personal 
communication with Guy Kilminster, Head of Health and Wellbeing Services, Cheshire 
East Council; September 2011). 
UK regional government level: Scottish Executive. In Scotland, the societal costs 
of alcohol misuse are estimated to range from £2,476.6 million to £4,635.4 million 
per annum, with a mid-point estimate of approximately £3,555.7 million. This means 
that alcohol misuse costs each Scottish adult £900 every year (Scottish Government, 
2010a). Against this background, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has spearheaded 
the campaign for minimum pricing in the UK. The SNP were elected to government 
for the first time in 2007 and set about changing the Scottish alcohol policy landscape. 
This included a consultation paper (Scottish Government, 2008) and follow-up strategic 
framework document (Scottish Government, 2009) focusing on the role of pricing and 
availability in influencing alcohol consumption. Following an expert workshop on 
alcohol price, policy and public health, the Scottish Health Action for Alcohol Problems 
made a series of recommendations, including a proposal for minimum pricing (SHAAP, 
2007). Modelling studies were also conducted by Sheffield University for the Scottish 
Government (e.g., ScHARR, 2009).
Against this background, the SNP proposed a minimum price of £0.45 per unit of 
alcohol in September 2010. According to Nicola Sturgeon - Deputy First Minister of the 
SNP and Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing - minimum pricing would result 
in 1,200 fewer hospital admissions and 22,900 fewer days absent from work in the 
first year of the policy, 2,600 fewer offences annually, and 225 fewer deaths within a 
decade; ultimately saving the country £721 million over a 10-year period38. Scotland’s 
Lord Advocate at the time, Elish Angiolini, argued that without minimum pricing the 
country faced an ‘apocalypse’ of alcohol-fuelled crime39. Under a £0.45 minimum 
pricing plan, a two-litre bottle of supermarket-brand cider would increase from £1.32 to 
almost £3.80 and supermarket-brand vodka would rise from £8 to £11.80. Whisky from 
the UK’s leading supermarkets, Asda and Tesco, would increase from £9.20 and £9.95, 
respectively, to £12.60, but there would be no change for other brands such as Bell’s, 
Whyte & Mackay, Famous Grouse or Johnnie Walker, which all currently retail above 
£14 (Currie, 2010). 
However, during the party’s first term (2007-2011) the SNP did not hold a majority of 
seats in the Scottish Parliament and the proposal was defeated by 49 votes to 76 as part 
of the third and final reading and so removed from the Alcohol etc (Scotland) Bill 2010 
in November 2010 (Scottish Government, 2010b). This defeat occurred despite SNP 
assurances of the inclusion of a sunset clause whereby the policy would be reviewed 
after six years in order to quell concerns about the lack of evidence-based practice. On 
this note, objections to the proposal were based on arguments that: minimum pricing 
has not been tested in practice and there are no natural experiments to draw from; the 
policy would unfairly penalise responsible drinkers and disproportionately target the 
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poorest in society; and raise incentives for substitution with other intoxicants (Chick, 
2010). Indeed, the alcohol industry were particularly vocal in their opposition arguing 
that minimum pricing would not effectively reduce consumption and alcohol-related 
harms; may lead to job losses; could cause damage to Scottish Whisky exports and the 
Scottish economy more generally; and infringe EU competition law (Christie, 2009). The 
Scottish Labour party argued that the policy effectively amounted to a tax imposed on 
the less affluent and benefited shareholders of the big supermarkets (Puttick, 2010). 
The Scottish administration rejected invitations to adopt the Westminster plan to ban 
below-cost sales in January 2011 (see below for a more detailed discussion of this 
policy), arguing that the proposal would have a negligible impact on reducing alcohol 
misuse and harm (Johnson, 2011a). The SNP included a pledge in their 2011 manifesto 
to introduce a minimum pricing bill as a priority in their first legislative programme if 
re-elected (SNP, 2011). In May 2011 they were re-elected to a second term by an historic 
landslide majority and in September the SNP unveiled their Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill. Specifically, the Bill was introduced in November 2011 and includes 
the principle of a minimum unit price for alcohol but not an actual price40. The SNP 
maintain that both components should be separately evaluated and and considered; 
indeed, the Sheffield modelling analyses are being re-run to provide more up-to-date 
data. Though the Bill will not be contingent on the opposition’s support due to the SNP’s 
majority, in June 2011 the Scottish Liberal Democrats made a policy u-turn, announcing 
that they were in favour of minimum pricing (Philip, 2011). 
Following the re-election of the SNP, the Scotch Whisky Association requested a 
meeting with the Scottish Executive to reiterate their concerns about the legal standing 
of the policy and long-term consequences on Scotch Whisky exports (i.e., it would 
potentially encourage countries keen on protecting their local markets to implement 
spurious health-based restrictions which exclude Scotch Whisky)41. The Scotch 
Whisky Association argue that £620 million could be lost in Scotch Whisky imports 
in over 140 markets worldwide and, in domestic markets, higher prices could led to 
counterfeit products, smuggling and job losses (Smith, 2009). The BBPA and Wine 
and Spirit Trade Association also oppose minimum pricing. For instance, the BBPA 
maintain that universal price interventions are a blunt instrument ill-suited to addressing 
alcohol misuse, and point out that many Scots could easily travel over the border to 
England, or go online, to purchase cheaper alcohol. By contrast, the Scottish Licensed 
Trade Association suggests that tackling irresponsible pricing by supermarkets will 
help alleviate alcohol-related problems and are hopeful that the SNP will implement 
minimum pricing soon (Perrett, 2011). 
Westminster Government. In England, recent estimates indicate that there were 
1,057,000 alcohol-related hospital admissions to hospital in 2009-10; 6,584 deaths were 
directly related to alcohol in 2009; and the cost of alcohol-related harm for the NHS 
was estimated to be £2.7 billion based on 2006-07 prices (NHS Information Service, 
2011). Against this background, in May 2010, the Coalition Government between the 
Liberal Democrats and Conservatives published their manifesto, including a pledge to 
ban below-cost sales of alcohol and to review alcohol taxation and pricing policies to 
address excessive drinking (HM Government, 2010). The Minister for crime prevention, 
James Brokenshire, noted that the move was intended to address the availability of 
cheap alcohol and reduce alcohol-related crime which costs the taxpayer £13 billion 
per annum. The new measures prevent retailers from selling a litre of vodka (37.5 per 
cent abv) for less than £10.71 (£0.29 per UK unit of alcohol) and a 440ml can of lager 
(4.2 per cent abv) for less than £0.38 (£0.21 per UK unit of alcohol) (Johnson, 2011b). 
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However, many public health bodies, including the British Medical Association, the 
Royal College of Physicians and Alcohol Concern, expressed disappointment at the 
government’s proposal arguing that it will not impact on the vast majority of low-
priced alcoholic beverages sold in supermarkets and will not help resolve Britain’s 
binge drinking problem. Don Shenker, who recently announced that he is stepping 
down as chief executive of Alcohol Concern, urged ministers to reconsider a minimum 
price per unit of alcohol because, since duty is so low in the UK, it would still be 
feasible to sell alcohol cheaply without breaking the law42. In fact in February 2011 
the Guardian newspaper published the results of a comprehensive review of drink 
price data collected by consultancy group Assosia (i.e., a data company which gathers 
weekly information on high-profile promotions by the UK’s four leading supermarkets). 
The review indicated that none of the 3,667 drink deals identified in the previous three 
months would increase in price under the new plans (Ball, 2011). Assosia identified 
15,746 alcohol promotions in supermarkets during 2010, of which 5,000 required 
customers to purchase multiple products in order to receive a discount. Alarmed at the 
ubiquity of offers encouraging excessive alcohol consumption, Alcohol Concern and the 
Royal College of Physicians called for a ban on such offers. In November 2011, the UK 
government announced that a ban on below-cost sales will come into effect in England 
and Wales from 6th April 2012.
The Responsibility Deal, launched in March 2011, represented an effort to bring 
organisations from the public, commercial, non-governmental, and academic sectors 
together to agree on pathways by which business and other organisations could best 
deliver improvements in public health (Department of Health, 2011). In regard to 
alcohol, the Deal consisted of a series of voluntary pledges from the alcohol industry 
on issues such as promotions and labelling aimed at targeting alcohol abuse in England. 
However, six43 health organisations rejected the plans on the basis that the pledges 
prioritise the views of the industry and are not measurable or based on evidence of what 
works successfully in practice, nor do they tackle important issues such as promotion 
of alcohol44. Furthermore, the pledges were criticised for aiming to foster a responsible 
drinking culture rather than target illness and death (Boseley, 2011). The Home 
Office defended the proposals on the grounds that they are a ‘starting point’ for the 
government’s plans to tackle below-cost selling and Health Secretary Andrew Lansley 
announced that a government alcohol strategy will be released in late 2011. However, 
the health bodies argue there is no evidence of a comprehensive cross-departmental 
strategy in tackling alcohol-related harm. 
Northern Ireland Executive. The Northern Ireland Assembly are considering 
introducing minimum pricing amid concerns about excessive drinking and the impact 
of cheap alcohol on health and resultant anti-social behaviour. A 16-week consultation 
was launched in March 2011 to elicit comments from interested individuals and 
organisations on minimum pricing, and alternatives including a ban on below-cost 
selling, VAT and duty increases, and the introduction of a social responsibility levy45. 
Alcohol misuse is estimated to cost the region approximately £680 million per annum 
in terms of overall social costs based on 2008-2009 prices (FGS McClure Watters &York 
Health Economics Consortium, 2010). 
The Departments for Health and Social Development proposed a minimum price 
between £0.40 and £0.70 per unit of alcohol. Under these proposals a six-pack of beer 
would cost £4.40 or £7.70, respectively, and the minimum price for a bottle of wine 
would be £4. A minimum unit price of £0.40 and a ban on promotions (the latter is 
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discussed further in ‘Bans on price discounts and promotions’) is estimated to decrease 
alcohol consumption by 5.4 per cent and result in a £13.5 million saving per annum to 
the health and social care sector46. At the time of writing, a report on the outcomes of 
the consultation is being finalised and will be publicly available in late 2011 (personal 
communication with Caroline Hobson, Social Policy Unit, Department of Social 
Development; October 2011).
Historically, alcohol has been cheaper north of the border with residents from the 
Republic of Ireland often travelling to Northern Ireland to purchase alcohol. Indeed, 
concern about the high volume of residents travelling north to purchase alcohol (as 
well as other goods), particularly during the busy festive period, have led to calls 
for ‘patriotic shopping’ from the Dáil Éireann government (Simpson, 2008). Shortly 
before the change of government and ministers in the Republic of Ireland in March 
2011 and Northern Ireland in May 2011, discussions took place between ministers 
from the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil Éireann government (under Fianna Fail) 
to introduce minimum pricing across Ireland47. In August 2011 Dublin’s Lord Mayor, 
Andrew Montague, called for the Dáil to work collaboratively with the Northern 
Ireland Assembly to introduce a minimum price for off-licence sales48. In October 2011, 
the Assembly’s Health Minister, Edwin Poots, announced that the Northern Ireland 
government were committed to introducing minimum pricing49.  This was followed by 
a similar announcement by Róisín Shortall, a minister in the Dáil Department of Health, 
involving a minimum price per ounce of alcohol. Shortall indicated that she has sought 
legal advice regarding implementation of the policy50.
Welsh Assembly. Finally, the Welsh Health Minister Assembly have voiced their 
support for minimum pricing51. The Assembly sought devolved powers to regulate 
alcohol prices, licensing and advertising, but their request was rejected in early 201152. 
Alcohol Concern Cymru has called upon the Welsh Assembly to be given powers to set 
a minimum price of £0.50 per unit of alcohol53. 
GRASSROOTS SUPPORT FOR MINIMUM PRICING OF 
ALCOHOL IN THE UK
In the UK, minimum pricing enjoys support from a wide range of health organisations 
and campaigners, including: Alcohol Focus Scotland; Alcohol Concern; Association 
of Chief Police Officers in Scotland; all four of the UK’s Chief Medical Officers; all 
17 directors of public health in NHS Scotland; British Liver Trust; British Medical 
Association; brewers Tennent’s and Molson Coors, and CAMRA (Campaign for Real 
Ale); Childline (as part of a consortium of Scottish Children’s organisations comprising 
Children 1ST, Aberlour, YouthLink Scotland, Barnardo’s Scotland, Action for Children 
Scotland, Quarriers, Parenting across Scotland); European Public Health Alliance;  
House of Commons Select Committee; National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence; Royal Colleges of Nursing, Physicians, Surgeons and GPs; Royal College 
of Psychiatrists in Northern Ireland; Scottish Licensed Trade Association; SHAAP; and 
the Youth Commission on Alcohol. In fact, in tandem with representatives from several 
of these organisations, a number of celebrities signed a public statement in support of 
minimum pricing in November 2010. In Ireland, Alcohol Action Ireland54 has voiced 
support for minimum pricing and higher alcohol taxes on the grounds that these 
measures will lower consumption rates; the Vintners Federation of Ireland supports 
minimum pricing as a means of ensuring that pubs are on a level playing field with 
supermarkets (O’Doherty, 2011). 
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In May 2010 the UK’s leading supermarket, Tesco, announced its support for minimum 
pricing with Morrisons following suit. In fact, in July 2010 Asda became the first 
supermarket chain to introduce a ban on below-cost alcohol sales. Specifically Asda 
introduced a policy banning the sales below the cost of duty plus VAT on 99 per cent of 
their alcohol products (store managers retained power to set prices for damaged or end 
of range products). Under this move, the cheapest price for a 750ml bottle of wine was 
£1.99, £10.49 for a one-litre bottle of vodka, and £8.95 for 20 440ml cans of 5 per cent 
abv beers55. Since then the VAT has increased from 17.5 per cent to 20 per cent and the 
duty has also risen. By our calculations the comparable prices in August 2011 would be 
£2.17 for wine; £12.25 for vodka and £9.80 for beer. In terms of a standard Australian 
drink (10mg of alcohol) these prices correspond to $0.28, $0.39 and $0.28, respectively. 
The analogous prices for a UK standard drink (10ml alcohol) are £0.22, £ 0.31 and 
£0.22 respectively. Sainsbury’s however oppose minimum pricing arguing that it would 
unfairly penalise customers and cite the lack of evidence indicating that this measure 
would curb excessive drinking.  
In terms of public opinion, an Ipsos MORI poll in 2010 indicated that only one-third 
of Scottish adults supported a government policy for increasing the price of discounted 
and low-price alcohol56. By contrast, a nationally representative survey of the Irish 
general population indicated that two out of three adults support minimum pricing57. 
Most recently, Hagger, Lonsdale, Baggot, Penny, and Bowen (2011) conducted focus 
groups in the UK to elicit public opinion about minimum pricing. The authors found 
that participants generally greeted the introduction of minimum pricing with scepticism, 
believing it would not be effective in reducing alcohol consumption. In addition, 
participants indicated that they believed minimum pricing would unfairly punish 
moderate drinkers and voiced concern that it may give rise to or exacerbate extant social 
problems, such as crime and drug abuse. The study highlighted that many failed to 
understand that minimum pricing is targeted at increasing the price of cheap alcoholic 
products rather than all alcoholic beverages and they often confused the measure 
with increases in excise duty. When asked what would increase the acceptability of 
minimum pricing, participants generally indicated that minimum pricing should be 
introduced as part of a package of policies aimed at significantly reducing excessive 
alcohol consumption and that the additional revenue generated should be directed at 
interventions.  
PROS AND CONS OF MINIMUM PRICING
Why should the sensible majority be penalised for the excesses of a small 
minority? One of the principal arguments levied against minimum pricing is that it 
would penalise the majority for the sake of a few. In actual fact, drinkers who consume 
alcohol within recommended guidelines would only be marginally affected. Minimum 
pricing directly targets cheap alcoholic beverages which tend to be purchased more 
often by heavy (weekly mean consumption of >21 to <50 UK units for men and >14 to 
<35 for women) and harmful drinkers (weekly mean consumption per week of >50 UK 
units for men and >35 units for women) rather than moderate drinkers (weekly mean 
consumption <=21 UK units for men and <=14 for women (Purshouse et al., 2010). 
Its greatest impact will be on those who buy the most off-trade alcohol (Department of 
Health, 2008; Griffith & Leicester, 2010). Modelling analyses from the UK suggest that 
a £0.50 minimum price per unit would increase a moderate drinker’s annual alcohol 
expenditure by £12, but a harmful drinker’s by £163 (Purshouse et al., 2010). 
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Contrary to arguments that low-income households would be disproportionately 
targeted under minimum pricing, findings from the UK Food and Expenditure Survey 
indicate that all income groups tend to purchase low price off-sales alcohol, not simply 
those with less disposable incomes. In fact, it is the middle-income groups who tend to 
purchase most low-price alcohol (Ludbrook, 2010a). This mirrors research by Griffith 
and Leicester (2010) who found that it is the more affluent households, rather than low-
income households, who tend to buy alcohol on special offer. 
‘Nanny is back and she is after your cask wine’. Though a floor price is currently 
hypothetical in Australia, cheap cask wine at least will be affected and, according to 
some media reports, the price could quadruple (Martin, 2011b). The WFA has objected 
on behalf of low-income cask wine consumers, especially age pensioners consuming 
modest amounts of alcohol (Winemakers’ Federation of Australia, 2009, 2011). 
Sociodemographic analyses of a nationally representative sample of Australian wine 
consumers suggests that wine consumers over the age of 55 purchase a higher share of 
cask wine, as do low income wine consumers (Mueller & Umberger, 2009). Richardson 
and Denniss (2011) remind us that the impact of the wine price increase on consumers 
should be weighed against the benefits of increased government revenue accruing from 
the wine taxation and the reduction in government spending on health care arising from 
diminished alcohol consumption, which could result in lower taxes in other areas and 
expanded government services. Furthermore, their analysis of household expenditure 
survey data showed that age pensioners devote a lower proportion of their expenditure 
to wine than the average Australian. 
Minimum pricing will encourage ‘cross-border white van activity’. Minimum 
pricing is likely to come into force in Scotland within the year. This has prompted 
concerns by the Wine and Spirit Trade Association that consumers, particularly those 
living in the Borders area, will travel to England to buy cheaper alcohol (Lodge, 2011). 
Indeed, as discussed above, a similar situation already exists between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland. Minimum pricing in Scotland also raises the possibility that 
consumers will turn to the internet to purchase alcohol. This is likely to have significant 
repercussions for alcohol retailers and businesses in the surrounding areas. 
Minimum pricing will damage the wine industry. The Australian Hotels Association 
supports minimum pricing (Henderson, 2010) but recently expressed concern that 
the local wine industry would be disproportionately affected under minimum pricing 
(Australian Hotels Association, 2011). In Australia, wine is currently taxed on an ad 
valorum basis (i.e., the cheaper the wine, the less it is taxed) compared to beer, spirits, 
liqueurs and other beverages which are taxed according to alcohol content by volume 
(abv). For example, a four-litre wine cask (9.5 per cent abv) retailing for $12.99 attracts 
an effective rate of tax of $4.96 per litre of alcohol, whereas the effective rate of tax 
for off-trade beer (4.5 per cent abv) is $31.85 per litre of alcohol and the effective rate 
for similar strength beer sold in on-trade premises is $22.42 per litre of alcohol. The 
Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (2009), in its submission to Australia’s Future Tax 
System, claimed that a change to a volumetric tax at the packaged beer rate of $40.82 
per litre would result in a price increase in 95 per cent of wine, a 34 per cent reduction 
in sales volume and reduced wine producer competitiveness in all markets, including 
exports, due to the increased cost base resulting from a lower scale of production.  It is 
worth mentioning that their submission did not include any background details to these 
claims.  
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Where does the additional revenue generated under minimum pricing go? An 
important difference between minimum pricing and taxation is that whereas increases 
in excise duties go directly to the government, the additional revenue generated under 
a minimum pricing scheme goes to the alcohol producers and off-licence retailers. 
Additional revenue is anticipated consequent on a price rise; price elasticity of demand 
estimate lies between 0 and -1, indicating that although consumption falls with price 
rises, expenditure increases. However, this caveat could be circumvented by borrowing 
policy initiatives from Scotland. Specifically, the Alcohol etc (Scotland) Bill 2010 
(Scottish Government, 2010b) includes a Social Responsibility Levy which enables 
the government to impose a fee on those selling alcohol to offset alcohol misuse costs. 
On a related note, since retailers could undermine minimum pricing through the use 
of promotions (e.g., happy hours), minimum pricing would be best implemented in 
complement to a ban on promotions. 
Does minimum pricing have legal standing? Finally, arguments against minimum 
pricing have been based on legal and competition policy grounds. In Australia, states 
and territories retain responsibility for licensing of alcohol retailers.  Minimum pricing 
legislation could be introduced by the states or territories, or the Commonwealth. Similar 
to arguments raised in European debates about minimum pricing, state based legislation 
potentially risks introducing barriers hindering the free trade in alcohol products 
between Australian states and territories. A recent review of the issues surrounding the 
introduction of minimum pricing advises that “because of the pre-eminence of National 
Competition Policy, the impact ... on competition will need to be carefully assessed” 
(Davoren, Scollo & O’Brien, 2011: 4).  Liquor accords offer a non-legislative, but less 
desirable alternative, whereby minimum prices within venues are agreed by signatory 
licensees, and authorisation obtained from the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (Davoren et al., 2011).  
Arguments surrounding the legality of minimum pricing have been central in Scottish 
debates about the policy. Minimum pricing is considered not to contravene UK 
competition regulations if prices are levied on licensees by law or a public authority 
(SHAAP, 2007). Some opponents nevertheless argue that minimum pricing is a trade 
-distorting policy that infringes EU competition law. Indeed, in 2009 the Irish Spirits 
Association indicated they were prepared to challenge the legality of minimum pricing 
legislation before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Peterkin, 2009). In March 2010, 
the ECJ ruled against legislation in France, Austria and Ireland involving tobacco 
minimum pricing. Specifically, they posited that the public health gain could be 
adequately achieved through increased taxation and that minimum pricing violated 
Council Directive 95/59/EC by limiting the ability of producers and importers to decide 
their maximum retail selling prices. However, the EU directive for alcohol (92/83/EC) is 
only concerned with excise duties and indeed on two separate occasions the European 
Commission has indicated that the Directive does not preclude Member States from 
levying minimum retail prices for alcoholic beverages. Against a background of loss-
leading practices and promotional offers, it is clear that alcohol taxation is not sufficient 
to ensure an increase in alcohol price. Accordingly, minimum pricing could legitimately 
be conceptualised as a means to achieve public health gains58.
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CallS fOr minimum priCing elSewhere 
The New Zealand Law Commission (2010) has recommended that the New Zealand 
Government investigate the impact of a minimum pricing scheme and deliver a formal 
report by 2012. Since this would involve collecting distribution and sales data from 
retailers to identify the most effective minimum price threshold, the Commission called 
for legislation requiring all off-licences to maintain a record of transactions according 
to product and price groupings. The Alcohol Reform Bill59 is designed to implement the 
Government’s response to the Law Commission report. Based on recommendations by 
the Justice and Electoral Committee, the Bill will include a provision that all alcohol 
outlets provide information to the Government, free of charge, on price and quantity of 
alcohol sold; those licensees who fail to comply will be fined (not exceeding $20,000)60. 
Drawing parallels between the cheap alcohol prices available in Scotland and New 
Zealand, the organisation have argued that a minimum price of at least $2 per standard 
drink should be introduced to reduce consumption, particularly among young people61.
A number of proxy minimum pricing policies exist in several European countries. In 
Germany, for instance, the Apple Juice law requires bars to offer at least one non-
alcoholic beverage cheaper than the cheapest alcohol beverage (Rabinovich et al., 
2009). Furthermore, in Switzerland some cantons (provinces) require that restaurants 
offer at least three alcohol-free drinks cheaper than the cheapest alcohol beverage of 
equivalent quantity (Rabinovich et al., 2009).  
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POLICY 4. BANS ON PRICE DISCOUNTS AND 
PROMOTIONS 
Over the past decade, alcohol marketing has expanded considerably in terms of the 
extent and repertoire of media and digital communication technologies (Babor et al., 
2010). This section focuses specifically on micro-level forms of alcohol marketing, 
namely price discounts and promotions (alcohol marketing and advertising more 
broadly falls under Babor et al.’s ‘restrictions on marketing’ strategy framework and is 
therefore not examined in this review). In on-trade settings (i.e., bars, clubs, restaurants), 
discounting and promotions of alcoholic beverages often take the form of ‘happy hour’, 
‘ladies drink free’, ‘two for one’, and ‘toss the boss’ offers62 in order to attract patrons, 
particularly price-sensitive patrons such as young adults. 
Research indicates that such marketing strategies increase alcohol consumption. In 
the United States, for instance, experimental studies have shown that the alcohol 
consumption of heavy and light drinkers more than doubled during simulated ‘happy 
hours’ (Babor, Mendelson, Greenberg, & Kuehnle, 1978; Babor, Mendelson, Uhly, & 
Souza, 1980). Kuo, Wechsler, Greenberg, and Lee (2003b) evaluated the impact of 
alcohol marketing in off- and on-trade establishments surrounding several colleges 
in the District of Columbia. Based on data from over 10,000 students, they found 
that higher rates of binge drinking were correlated with the availability of large 
volumes of beer, exterior and interior advertising, and promotions including volume 
discounts, price specials, and coupons. Thombs et al. (2008, 2009) reported significant 
associations between intoxication and drink specials, particularly with ‘all you can 
drink’ promotions. In off-trade settings (i.e., bottleshops, supermarkets) alcohol is 
heavily discounted and sold as a loss-leader in order to attract customers into a store. 
As discussed in the ‘Minimum pricing of alcohol’ passage earlier, minimum pricing has 
been put forward as a means of counteracting such discounting practices.
As Kuo et al. (2003b) suggest regulating marketing practices (e.g., promotions, sale 
prices) represents a promising avenue for reducing alcohol consumption and related 
harms among young people. Modelling analyses by Purshouse et al. (2010) suggest 
that restrictions on large discounts (e.g., buy one get one free offers) would not be 
particularly effective in reducing weekly consumption and health harms but tight 
restrictions or total bans on off-trade discounting could achieve the equivalent effect of 
minimum price thresholds of £0.30-£0.40. 
Bans or restrictions on happy-hour style promotions have been introduced in several 
EU member states. In the Republic of Ireland, for instance, the Intoxicating Liquor Act 
200363 banned ‘happy hour’ promotions and the Intoxicating Liquor Act 200864 included 
a ban on loyalty card schemes to address concerns about binge drinking. Several 
states in the USA (e.g., Massachusetts, Kansas) prohibit or restrict drink specials such as 
‘happy hour’ and the hours during which venues may offer discounts65. In Canada, for 
instance, restrictions on happy hour promotions were introduced in Alberta in 2008. 
A patron is not allowed to buy more than two standard drinks after 1am, and special 
drink prices must not be below the approved minimum prices of the Alberta Gaming 
and Liquor Commission66. Furthermore, in Ontario licensed premises are prohibited 
from advertising liquor prices and promotions, both inside and outside venues, in a 
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manner which encourages excessive consumption (specifically the phrase ‘happy hour’ 
is banned) and drink prices that are based on the purchase of other drinks are prohibited 
(e.g., ‘two for one’ offer, ‘second drink is half off’)67.
However, despite the introduction of such bans and restrictions, little empirical research 
has examined their impact (Babor et al., 2010). Smart and Adlaf (1986) and Smart (1996) 
evaluated the effects of happy-hour bans in Canada and the United States, respectively, 
and found little evidence of a decline in alcohol consumption; however as Babor et al. 
(2010) point out both studies suffered from methodological limitations. 
Meier et al. (2010) concluded that banning off-trade promotions would induce a 2.8 
per cent reduction in population level consumption in England, but only a 0.9 per 
cent reduction in the consumption of hazardous drinking by young people. Women’s 
consumption would reduce more than men’s (4.1 per cent versus 2.1 per cent) and 
hazardous and harmful drinkers would consume 3 per cent less while the consumption 
of moderate drinkers would fall by less than 2 per cent. There was insufficient 
information to explore the effects of banning on-trade promotions. Analyses for the 
Scottish government considered the application of non-specific minimum pricing with 
a ban on off-trade promotions. A total ban on off-trade discounting was estimated to 
reduce overall Scottish consumption by 3.1 per cent and a £0.50 minimum price would 
reduce overall consumption by 6.7 per cent; a combination of both policies would 
reduce consumption by 8.7 per cent (Purshouse et al., 2010). 
In June 2011, English trade leaders and licensees called on the Government to take 
action on the failure of supermarkets to remove alcohol promotions from their store 
entrances. At the time of writing, only Asda had removed alcohol promotions from 
their entrances and Health Secretary Andrew Lansley had written to the other major 
supermarkets (i.e., Sainsbury’s, Tesco, the Co-op, Marks and Spencer, Waitrose) inviting 
them to commit to the government’s Responsibility Deal (discussed above) (Pescod, 
2011). 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AND CODES OF PRACTICE
Restrictions or bans on price discounts and promotions generally fall under regulatory 
frameworks. Regulatory frameworks may be conceptualised on a continuum, with 
self-regulation (or industry-led regulation) at one end and government regulation (or 
‘command and control’ regulation) at the other end (New Zealand Law Commission, 
2010: 331) . The space between both endpoints comprises a variety of options involving 
components of both forms of regulations, including enforced self-regulation and co-
regulation (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). 
Under self-regulation, there is little if any government involvement, apart from the 
general underlying legal framework relating to consumer protection, business, contracts, 
and competition. Accordingly, “the rules that govern market behaviour are developed, 
administered and enforced by the people whose behaviour is to be governed, rather 
than being imposed by the state” (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010: 331). Self-
regulation is usually practised through codes of practice. As indicated by its name, under 
government regulation, the government sets the rules. 
Under enforced self-regulation, a model developed by Ayers and Braithwaite (1992), 
the state and individual firms collaboratively establish regulations that are particularised 
to the circumstances of each firm. Each firm is required to draft their own regulatory 
standards or the state will impose harsher, less tailored standards. This strand of self-
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regulation is enforced in the sense that: (i) the state requires the firm to undertake 
self-regulation and (ii) the privately written rules of practice are publicly enforceable. 
Co-regulation involves industry self-led regulation with some degree of ratification by 
government. 
Each regulatory model is associated with strengths and caveats. For instance, the 
strengths of government regulation include universal coverage, compulsions, and a 
legal framework to ensure guidelines are enforced, democratic accountability, minimum 
standards relating to quality and service performance. On the other hand, government 
regulation may be argued to be expensive, inefficient, ill-suited to promoting innovation, 
and associated with enforcement difficulties. Indeed, as pointed out in the New Zealand 
Law Commission report (2010), punitive enforcement may foster a ‘regulatory cat and 
mouse’ game in which industry goes against the spirit of the law by taking advantages 
of loop-holes, to which the state responds by writing additional, more specific rules 
to close such loopholes. The alcopops tax and subsequent adaptive marketing by the 
alcohol industry is an example of this practice. As discussed in the ‘Special/additional 
tax	–	alcopops	tax’	section	earlier,	alcopops	manufacturers	exploited	loopholes	in	
the alcopops tax legalisation by manufacturing beer- and wine-based alcopops to 
circumvent the tax, to which the government subsequently responded by introducing 
legislation to close this loophole.  
Self-regulation has the advantages of being cheaper and more flexible as it requires close 
scrutiny by government bodies. It may also foster a culture of engagement, goodwill 
and responsibility on the industry’s part who wish to avoid being imposed with greater 
regulation. However, self-regulation may be abused and the system lacks democratic 
accountability (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). 
A comprehensive list of international codes is available elsewhere (Burkitt, 2007; 
International Center for Alcohol Policies, 2001). The following passages summarise a 
selection of such regulatory frameworks, followed by an in-depth overview of regulatory 
frameworks in each state and territory in Australia. 
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Foundation for the Responsible Use of 
Alcohol (STIVA), an industry organisation, developed an Advertising Code with rules 
governing alcohol promotions. As part of this Code, alcohol promotions are prohibited 
in premises where one-quarter or more of the patrons are minors. Furthermore, premises 
are prohibited from engaging in the following promotional activities: selling alcoholic 
beverages for less than half price or for free, offering more than one discounted drink 
per customer; or offering alcohol discounts in combination with additional free gifts. The 
Royal Dutch Catering Industry has also published self-regulatory guidelines. Specifically 
cash discounts should not target people younger than 18 years old, not take place close 
to closing time, include non-alcoholic drinks and/or snacks, and not be more than half 
of the original price (van Hoof, van Noordenburg, & de Jong, 2008). 
UK. A number of industry Codes of Practice are in place in the UK such as the BBPA’s 
Standards for the Management of Responsible Drinks Promotions68 and the Portman 
Group Code of Practice on the Naming, Packaging and Promotion of Alcoholic 
Drinks69. For instance, the BBPA’s guidelines outline a number of promotions that are 
deemed irresponsible, including promotions that involve large amounts of free alcohol 
(e.g., women drink free), entry fees which are linked to unlimited quantities of drinks 
(e.g. ‘£x.99 on the door and all your drinks are free’), and reward schemes that are 
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redeemable only within short time periods and which encourage the purchase and 
consumption of large quantities of alcohol. 
However, an independent review indicated that self-regulation standards are not 
consistently adopted and applied across the alcohol industry (KPMG, 2008). As a 
consequence, a Mandatory Code of Practice70 was introduced for the sale of alcohol in 
licensed premises in England and Wales in April 2010 under the Policing and Crime 
Act 2009 and Licensing Act 2003. The mandatory conditions were introduced in two 
stages: the first three conditions (irresponsible promotions, the ‘dentist’s chair’ [defined 
below], and free tap water) were introduced in April 2010 and the remaining two 
conditions (age verification policies and smaller measures) came into effect in October 
2010. Of relevance to the current context, the Code bans irresponsible promotions 
which includes: (i) drinking games; (ii) large quantities of alcohol free or at a fixed or 
discounted rate (e.g., half price drinks for under-25s, women drink free, ‘all you can 
drink for £10’); and (iii) the use of alcohol as prizes or rewards. In addition, promotions 
that involve alcohol being poured directly into a customer’s mouth (i.e., the dentist’s 
chair) either by the bartender or another customer are prohibited. Licensees who fail 
to comply with these conditions face a fine of up to £20,000 and/or a six month prison 
sentence, as well as a review of the premise’s licence. 
The Licensing (Scotland) Act 200571, which came into effect in September 2009, 
marked the first major overhaul of Scottish licensing laws in 30 years. The Act bans 
irresponsible alcohol promotions (e.g., the supply of alcohol free or at a reduced price 
upon the purchase of one of more drinks, supply of unlimited amounts of alcohol for 
a fixed price). Though the Act appeared promising in reducing alcohol consumption, 
in December 2010 a loophole in the law allowed Mitchells and Butlers (the leading 
operator of pubs and restaurants in the UK) to successfully mount a challenge to a 
decision taken by the Dundee Licensing Board banning student loyalty cards in one 
of the firm’s city venues (Braiden, 2010). The presiding QC, Sherriff Principal Robert 
Dunlop, ruled that although the Act states that drink discounts must be in place for 
72 hours, it does not prohibit offering different prices to different groups of people. 
Accordingly, on-trade venues were allowed to continue offering discount drink 
promotions to groups such as students. Disconcertingly in March 2011 ‘pub vouchers’, 
which allow recipients to purchase alcoholic beverages from more than 100 Scottish 
establishments, were introduced in Scotland. The scheme, which was adopted in 
England and Wales 18 months previously and markets the vouchers as gifts for birthdays 
or incentives/rewards to staff, has been criticised by health advocates for encouraging 
binge drinking as each voucher must be spent in a single transaction (Bradley, 2011).
In May 2011, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association launched a campaign entitled 
‘Level the playing field’72 to dismiss claims that the 2005 Act only applies to on-
trade premises. The campaign maintains that supermarkets are ignoring public health 
objectives by selling alcohol too cheaply. Support has been sought from corporate 
suppliers to the licensed trade, police, the NHS, and other health bodies73. More 
recently, the Alcohol etc (Scotland) Bill 2010 (Scottish Government, 2010b) was passed 
to include a ban on multi-buy promotions in off-trade venues (e.g., ‘three for the price 
of two’, ‘buy one, get one free’, ‘buy six, get 20 per cent off), restrictions on alcohol 
promotions in off-trade venues and, similar to the 2005 Act, a ban on irresponsible 
drinks promotions in on-trade venues. As mentioned earlier, due to opposition minimum 
pricing was excluded from the Act. The majority of the Act’s provisions came into force 
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on 1 October 2011. Early anecdotal evidence suggests that supermarket chains, such as 
Tesco, are attempting to circumvent the legislation banning discounted promotions by 
expanding online alcohol sales. Specifically, Tesco emailed Scottish customers informing 
them that if they buy alcohol online they can still avail of discounted alcohol prices as 
alcohol will be dispatched from England which is not affected by the new law (Braiden, 
2011).
Finally, the Northern Ireland Assembly intend to introduce measures banning 
promotions in the region and launched an eight-week consultation in 2010 seeking 
views and comments from relevant groups. Promotions deemed as irresponsible 
included the unlimited supply of alcohol for a fixed charge (e.g., ‘all you can drink for 
£10’), and offers which encourage specific groups to drink for free/at a discount (e.g., 
‘half price drinks for under-25s’) amongst others. Notably, unlike the Mandatory Code 
for England and Wales, happy hour promotions are listed as an irresponsible alcohol 
promotion. The legislation was anticipated to come into effect in mid-201174.  
New Zealand. The National Protocol on Alcohol Promotions75 outlines acceptable 
and unacceptable promotional practices. For instance, promotions which encourage 
excessive consumption within an unreasonable time period are prohibited (e.g., all 
you can drink; two for one) whereas promotions offering a complementary standard 
drink upon arrival are acceptable. The national protocol was developed by the Alcohol 
Advisory Council of New Zealand, the Hospitality Association of New Zealand, New 
Zealand Police, and Local Government New Zealand. The Sale of Liquor Act 1989 
includes an amendment (section 154A) whereby licensees and managers of licensed 
premises face up to a NZ$5,000 fine if they advertise promotions which encourage 
excessive alcohol consumption.
The New Zealand Law Commission (2010) recently recommended that a new offence 
be introduced (replacing Section 154A of the Act) relating to irresponsible alcohol 
promotion and consumption. They suggest that a new offence should cover: promoting 
free alcohol, offering goods or services on the proviso that alcohol is purchased, and 
advertisements external to a venue which suggest that alcohol is sold at a discount of 25 
per cent or more below its normal price. 
AUSTRALIA
Similar to several other countries such as the UK, Australia operates a voluntary, 
industry-led regulatory approach to alcohol advertising (Jones, Hall, & Numro, 2008). 
This includes the Advertiser Code of Ethics developed by the Australian Association 
of National Advertisers (AANA). Alongside this Code, the AANA allowed the alcohol 
industry to develop its own code, the Alcoholic Beverages Advertising Code (ABAC) as 
well as its own complaints management system, the Alcoholic Beverages Advertising 
Code Complaints Adjudication Panel. 
In terms of alcohol promotions specifically, individual codes of practice have been 
developed at state/territory level. Regulations on alcohol promotions in each Australian 
state and territory are discussed in some detail below; some codes are mandatory 
and enforceable (i.e., Australian Capital Territory , New South Wales, South Australia, 
Victoria), others are voluntary (i.e., Western Australia, Queensland), and still other states 
do not have any alcohol promotion guidelines (i.e., Tasmania). 
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Australian Capital Territory (ACT). Under the Liquor Bill 2010, any promotions which 
encourage excessive, rapid, or irresponsible consumption of alcohol are prohibited 
in the ACT. Section 29 of the Liquor Regulation 201076 further outlines promotional 
activities which are banned. The Act is mandatory and enforceable; inspectors and 
police officers are authorised to enter premises and exercise regulatory functions in 
accordance with the Act; up to 50 penalty units may be imposed on those breaching the 
Act (personal communication with Erin Maplesden, Client Service Officer, ACT Rental 
Bonds, Office of Regulatory Services; July 2011). Examples of prohibited promotional 
activities include, advertising drinking games (so-called ‘boat races’), ‘laybacks’, 
‘shooters’, and promotions which target a particular group (e.g., ‘a cocktail for sale only 
to women’). 
New South Wales (NSW). In April 2009 the NSW Office of Liquor, Gaming and 
Racing published the Liquor Promotion Guidelines77 under section 102 of the Liquor Act 
2007. The guidelines are mandatory and enforceable; compliance officers, the police 
and members of the general public can report to the NSW Office of Liquor, Gaming 
and Racing if a venue fails to adhere to the Guidelines (personal communication with 
Christine Carlin, Compliance Officer, NSW Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing; 
September 2011). Those licensees who fail to comply face fines of up to $5,500. The 
guidelines replaced the voluntary NSW Liquor Industry’s Code of Practice: Responsible 
Promotion of Liquor Products. Unlike the Code, the Guidelines more clearly outline 
what constitutes an unacceptable alcohol promotion and have a statutory basis. They 
also take into account more recent forms of promotions activities such as viral marketing 
and point-of-sale promotions (discussed in further detail below) that were outside the 
remit of the original Code78. 
In the first study of its kind, Jones and Lynch (2007a) investigated the nature of non-
advertising promotions in licensed venues in Wollongong and the extent to which 
such promotions conform to the NSW Liquor Industry’s Code of Practice: Responsible 
Promotion of Liquor Products. The authors observed a high number of promotions 
which appear to attract university students (e.g., free entry for students, student happy 
hours, and free transport between university campuses and venues) and encourage 
excessive drinking. They highlighted several instances where promotions were in breach 
of the Code and note that compliance checking was lacking. 
Northern Territory (NT). The Northern Territory Licensing Commission has published 
the Code of Practice for Responsible Promotion of Alcohol On-Premise and the Code of 
Practice to assist in the Responsible Promotion of Alcohol79 which outlines acceptable 
and unacceptable practices in relation to alcohol promotion. The Codes of practice are 
mandatory and enforceable by a team of licensing inspectors and police; the general 
public can also report any breaches of the code (personal communication with Zoë 
Langridge, Regulatory Systems Project Officer, Licensing Regulation and Alcohol 
Strategy, NT Department of Justice; June 2011). At present, any infringements are heard 
by a tribunal who can issue an Order to Cease Trading, impose additional licensing 
conditions, or rule that any future promotions/advertising need to be pre-approved. 
More recently, the Liquor Act80 came into force on 1st September 2011 regulating alcohol 
promotions. It provides the Director of Licensing with the power to issue infringement 
notices and track an offender’s history of previous infringement notices.
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Queensland (QLD). Restrictions on alcohol promotions are included in the Liquor 
Act 1992 and the Liquor Regulation 200281. In response to extreme discounts and free 
drink promotions targeting young people, the Liquor Act came into effect in April 2005 
and prohibits external advertising of drink prices, free drinks, multiple drinks and/or 
discounted alcoholic beverages at all licensed premises in the State82. In June 2005, 
the QLD Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation introduced the Code of Practice for 
the Responsible Service, Supply and Promotion of Liquor83. These guidelines outline 
acceptable and unacceptable promotion practices but provide definitions of terms such 
as ‘rapid, ‘excessive’ and ‘promotion’ which are included but not defined in the Liquor 
Act or Liquor Regulation.  The Code of Practice is not enforceable and accordingly 
no sanctions can be imposed for breaches of the Code (personal communication 
with Emma Sampson, Policy and Research Officer, QLD Office of Regulatory Policy, 
Department of Justice and Attorney General; September 2011).
South Australia (SA). In July 2010 the Review of the Code of Practice for Licensed 
Premises84 was released by the Office of Liquor and Gambling Commissioner in 
South Australia but, at the time of writing, has not yet been approved. This Review is 
intended as an update to the current Code of Practice85 which is under section 42 of 
the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 and been in force since September 1997. The Code is 
mandatory and enforceable; those licensees who fail to comply face disciplinary action 
or prosecution. The Review is more specific in terms of promotions than the original 
Code, meaning that it is more readily enforceable; inspectors routinely inspect premises 
for breaches of the Code and the police have a licensing enforcement branch (personal 
communication with Vicki Brunello, Legal and Policy Advice Officer, SA Office of 
Liquor and Gambling Commissioner; June 2011). In terms of promotions, the Review 
states, for instance, that licensees are banned from employing practices that encourage 
rapid or excessive alcohol consumption such as ‘all you can drink’ admission charges, 
promotions aimed a particular group, and happy hour-style promotions before 3pm and 
after 9pm. 
Tasmania (TAS). In Tasmania, alcohol sales are regulated by the Liquor Licensing Act 
1990. Currently there are no guidelines for alcohol promotion in Tasmania. Compliance 
inspectors and police officers may investigate breaches of the Liquor Act; whilst 
promotions such as ‘toss the boss’ are not as common as they once were, occasionally 
there are promotions for cheap beer. On some occasions the police attend these nights 
and speak with the licensee, even though the promotions are not illegal (personal 
communication with Peter O’Sullivan, Communications and Education Manager, Liquor 
and Gaming Branch, Department of Treasury and Finance; June 2011).
Victoria (VIC). Under the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 (the Act), licensees in 
Victoria are obligated to ensure that alcohol is served responsibly. Consequently, the 
Guidelines for Responsible Liquor Advertising and Promotions86 were developed to 
assist licensees in understanding the standards and conduct expected of them regarding 
promotions. The Guidelines outline 16 principles that provide licensees with a quick 
reference guide and direction on the kinds of promotion that are likely to encourage 
irresponsible consumption of alcohol (e.g., toss the boss, drink cards) or are otherwise 
not in the public interest, and as such may be banned under the Act. The guidelines are 
mandatory and enforceable. Compliance inspectors undertake widespread inspections to 
ensure that licensees are meeting their obligations under the Act. This includes ensuring 
that alcohol is promoted and sold in a way that encourages responsible and appropriate 
drinking. Under section 115A of the Act, the Director of Liquor Licensing has the power 
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to ban inappropriate promotions and, in doing so, will apply the principles in the 
Guidelines to assess whether a promotion is likely to lead to irresponsible consumption 
or is otherwise not in the public interest. Should this be the case, the Director may 
issue a banning notice that requires the licensee to take specified action. Failure by the 
licensee to comply with the banning notice may result in fines of more than $14,000 
(personal communication with Brendan Facey, Director of Responsible Alcohol Victoria, 
VIC Department of Justice; September 2011). 
Western Australia (WA). In Western Australia, the Department of Racing, Gaming and 
Liquor provides guidelines for alcohol promotions entitled Responsible promotion of 
liquor for consumption on premises and for packaged liquor87. The guidelines outline 
unacceptable practices: for instance, drink or loyalty cards that create incentives for 
rapid alcohol consumption or for the customer to drink more than they otherwise might 
are prohibited. The guidelines are not mandatory or enforceable, although compliance 
and police officers can inspect licensed premises. If they consider that a venue does 
not comply with these guidelines they can impose special conditions on the licensee 
(personal communication with Richard Gregor, Client Liaison Officer, WA Department 
of Racing, Gaming and Liquor; September 2011). Specifically, Section 64(3) of the 
Liquor Control Act 1988 enables the licensing authority to impose conditions on a 
licensee that ban promotional activities which provide alcohol free or at discounted 
prices, or encourage irresponsible alcohol consumption. 
In April 2011, the Director of Liquor Licensing in Western Australia announced that 
alcohol shots and energy drinks mixed with alcohol would be banned after midnight 
in all inner-city Perth bars, pubs and clubs. After 1am these venues are also prohibited 
from serving drinks in containers larger than 750ml, meaning that bottles of wine and 
jugs of beer and cocktails will be prohibited. Additionally, cocktails with more than 
75ml of alcohol are banned after 1am88. These measures are part of efforts to reduce 
alcohol-fuelled violence in the region. At the time of writing, the South Australia 
State Government is considering adopting similar bans89. Internationally, concerns 
surrounding energy drinks have led to their banning in France, Denmark and Norway. 
POINT-OF-PURCHASE PROMOTIONS
Point-of-purchase (POP) or point-of-sale promotions refers to promotional merchandise 
in a store or venue that are available upon purchase of a given product (e.g., free 
cooler bag upon purchase of two bottles of wine). POP promotions have become an 
increasingly important marketing strategy, with US companies spending an estimated 
US$17 billion on product promotions in stores (Belch & Belch, 2001). In fact, POP 
promotions can be found in approximately 90 per cent of stores that sell alcohol 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003) and evidence indicates that POP 
beer promotions can considerably increase sales (Beverage Industry Magazine, 2001).
In the United States, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) governs 
alcohol distribution as part of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. POP promotions 
are deemed legal provided they do not threaten retailer independence or retail 
competition. In other words, these regulations are concerned with protecting free trade 
rather than public health (Bray, Loomis, & Engelen, 2007). In Australia there is no 
regulatory system in place to monitor POP promotions in off-trade sales and, unlike the 
tobacco literature, relatively scant research attention has been paid to these types of 
alcohol promotions (Jones & Lynch, 2007a; 2007b). 
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In the first study of its kind in Australia, Jones and Lynch (2007b) conducted an 
observational study to identify the nature and extent of POP promotions of beer and 
alcopops in metropolitan retail venues in Wollongong (NSW). Promotions fell into three 
categories (i.e., gift with purchase, competitions, and buy some get some free) with 
the most popular being a gift with purchase. The authors noted that the offer of free 
branded merchandise upon purchase was concerning as the offer of desirable goods 
(e.g., cooler bags) may increase the likelihood of purchase. In fact, research elsewhere 
indicates that young people who own alcohol promotional items were more likely to 
have initiated alcohol use and be current drinkers (Hurtz, Henriksen, Wang, Feighery, 
& Fortmann, 2007; McClure, Dal Cin, Gibson, & Sargent, 2006; McClure, Stoolmiller, 
Tanski, Worth, & Sargent, 2009; Workman, 2003). The authors noted that, in light of the 
burgeoning literature indicating an inverse relationship between alcohol price and level 
of consumption, the ‘buy some, get some free’ promotions were particularly concerning. 
A similar study was conducted in 24 hotel bottleshops and liquor stores in metropolitan 
areas of Sydney and Perth (Jones & Barrie, 2010). POP promotions were highly 
prevalent, amounting to 416 across 24 audits and an average of 17.3 per venue. Most 
promotions focused on spirits or liquors and wines, and the most popular type of 
promotion was competitions. The authors note their concern that participation in the 
majority of unique promotions (97 per cent) generally required consumers to purchase 
a large number of standard drinks, approximately 19.3 per promotion. The findings 
highlight the need for research examining the impact of POP promotions on the 
consumption rates of young adults, and the introduction of regulatory systems to monitor 
POP promotions.
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SUMMARY OF PRICING AND  
TAXATION POLICY OPTIONS
Taxation. Alcohol tax is but one part of the retail price of alcoholic products, of 
which there are myriad. The extent to which changes in tax rates impact retail prices 
is not well documented. There is evidence that the pass-through of tax to retail prices 
depends on the behaviour of buyers and sellers, including competition in retailing 
and production, and can vary markedly between products and where they are sold. 
While proven useful from a public health perspective, alcohol taxation systems are not 
purpose-built to achieve public health outcomes. Still, particularly in countries with high 
levels of hazardous drinking, taxation is considered to be one of the most cost-effective 
policies for reducing alcohol consumption (Wagenaar et al., 2009, 2010; World Health 
Organization, 2007). 
Alcohol tax falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government in Australia. States and 
territories have no power to set or adjust alcohol taxes. Currently, an ad valorem tax 
is imposed on wine (i.e., the WET) whereas beer, spirits, liqueurs and other beverages 
are taxed on a volumetric basis. When measured against the volume of pure alcohol 
in a product, spirits and RTDs are taxed most heavily; the tax on beer increases 
with its alcohol content and beer sold on-trade is taxed more heavily than beer sold 
in bottleshops and liquor stores. Wines of the same alcohol content are not taxed 
consistently. Cheap wine, often sold in casks attracts minimal tax whereas premium 
wine, selling for upwards of $40 per bottle, has an effective tax rate higher rate than that 
applied to spirits and RTDs. 
The Henry Review (2010) concluded that the social (spillover) costs associated with 
alcohol abuse were not targeted effectively by current taxation arrangements and 
the Panel called for a common tax rate according to alcohol content to address this, 
including a low alcohol threshold. If the common rate suggested by the Henry Review 
were adopted the taxes on spirits, RTDs and expensive wines would be cut. The 
National Preventative Health Taskforce (2009) also supports a volumetric tax but would 
prefer that the tax rate be raised to the current rate on spirits, and argues for a tiered 
approach. Within a tiered approach, the tax rate increases with alcohol content to 
provide incentives for the consumption and production of low alcohol content products 
and disincentives for the production and consumption of high alcohol content products. 
This proposal has received widespread support from over fifty leading Australian health 
organisations (i.e., the NAAA).The incumbent federal government has so far rejected 
calls for a volumetric taxation system (Australian Government, 2010; Australian Treasury, 
2010). 
Currently the UK operates a tiered alcohol tax system. Spirits are taxed most heavily, 
followed by wine and beer, with cider attracting the lowest tax. Calls to apply a common 
tax rate on the basis of alcohol content were rejected by an HM Treasury review, due 
to the concern that increasing the tax rates on cider, beer and wine to levels consistent 
with the tax rate on spirits would penalise responsible drinkers, and may not facilitate 
the government’s broader objective of reducing problem drinking (HM Treasury, 2010). 
A recent increase in the duty on high-strength beers and reduction in the duty on lower-
strength beers points to its commitment to a tiered system.
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In the EU, member states are free to set their own alcohol taxes at levels; at least as 
high as minimum excise duty rates for spirits, beer and intermediate products such as 
fortified and liqueur wines, set by the European Commission in 1993. No minimum rate 
however is set for wine. Considerable variability exists in country rates. In general, the 
highest tax rates are imposed by the Nordic countries, followed by Ireland and the UK. 
Recent international comparisons suggest that Australia’s current tax rates for spirits and 
relatively expensive wines are of a similar level to Nordic rates, although beer might be 
taxed more heavily. Australia’s tax rates for cheaper wines are well below the rates set 
by these countries.
An important strength of Australia’s tax system is the fact that the rates of tax are 
indexed. Since the introduction of minimum duty rates in the EU, these rates have not 
increased in nominal terms meaning that their real value has declined by approximately 
one-third. Among the reasons for this lack of adjustment is that proposed changes must 
be agreed upon by all Member States and, because the excise duty for wine is zero, 
many wine-producing nations have been unwilling to accept a positive excise duty rate. 
Accordingly, it has been difficult to argue that the excise duty for other alcohol products 
should be increased. In 2008, the UK introduced an alcohol duties escalator to increase 
alcohol duty at 2 per cent above inflation until 2015 to remedy reductions in the real 
rate of its alcohol duties (particularly on spirits) (Griffith & Leicester, 2010). 
The potential for taxation policy to achieve public health outcomes in the Australian 
context is evidenced by the success of the Northern Territory LWA hypothecated levy 
in reducing the number of acute alcohol-related deaths and possibly reducing chronic 
alcohol-related disease. The success of the Northern Territory cask wine levy in reducing 
alcohol consumption supports efforts to target the lowest priced alcohol products with 
tax, at least when harmful drinking is associated with those cheapest products and the 
population at risk cannot afford to drink more expensive alcohol. 
Special/additional taxation - Alcopops tax. Following their introduction to the 
market in the second half of the 1990s, alcopops or RTDs increased in popularity 
(Metzner & Kraus, 2008). Their sweet taste, pleasant flavouring, attractive design, 
advertising, and low price are considered to make these beverages especially appealing 
to young people. Concerns about high alcohol consumption levels among young adults 
have led several countries to impose special taxes on these beverages. For instance, 
Switzerland imposed a 300% tax increase on alcopops in February 2004 and Australia 
levied a 70% increase in April 2008.
Where international evidence-based research is available (i.e., Switzerland, Germany), 
it suggests there was an immediate decline in alcopops consumption after the tax 
increase, substitution into other products and a subsequent return to growth in alcopops 
consumption. Indeed, alcohol manufacturers developed beer-based alcopops (e.g., 
Smirnoff Platinum) to circumvent the special tax and retain customers favouring sweet 
drinks similar to cordial (Wicki et al., 2006).
Much of the extant evidence for an alcopops tax is Australian. The available evidence 
suggests that following the introduction of the alcopops tax and the anti-binge-drinking 
advertising campaign, the alcohol industry responded with adaptive marketing strategies 
and there was a marked reduction in the sales and consumption of alcopops in the 
ensuing year and incomplete substitution into spirits (and possibly other alcoholic 
products) (Australian Government, 2009; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011a; Doran & 
Digiusto, in press). While it seems likely that the reduction in consumption was brought 
about by the tax increase and associated price rise, the evidence will only be definitive if 
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researchers are able to apportion the effects of the advertising campaign, general media 
reporting and GFC induced reduction in income per capita. Furthermore, the impact 
on young people’s consumption of alcopops and other alcohol products is yet to be 
determined and the indication of some growth in alcopops sales in 2010 suggests that 
longer term trends need to be documented (Euromonitor International, 2011a).
Notwithstanding this, as demonstrated by national and international evidence, it 
is our view that the potential for a targeted tax increase on a specific ‘problem’ 
alcoholic beverage to impact on the problematic alcohol consumption patterns can 
be undermined by substitution with other alcohol products (cf. New Zealand Law 
Commission, 2010). Indeed, research elsewhere indicates that young adults, risky and 
harmful drinkers consume a range of alcohol products90. Furthermore, the alcohol 
industry has the ability to absorb tax increases (at least partially) and subvert tax 
increases with the creation of ‘similar’ products that circumvent the tax. Accordingly, 
we would argue that a package of policy measures rather than a single targeted, isolated 
intervention offers a more promising avenue for achieving public health objectives. 
Minimum pricing. Minimum pricing sets a floor price per unit of pure alcohol 
(UK definition)/per standard drink (Australian definition) that cannot be undercut by 
supermarket deep discounting, adaptive marketing and below-cost sales strategies. In 
this way, minimum pricing off-sets inherent caveats associated with taxation. It also 
represents a better policy than alternative below-cost sale bans, such as that adopted by 
the incumbent Westminster Government which is predicted to have a negligible impact 
on the majority of low price alcohol. By linking harm (units of alcohol/standard drinks) 
to a disincentive (price), minimum pricing directly targets cheaper alcoholic beverages 
which are consumed by heavy rather than moderate drinkers (Donaldson & Rutter, 
2011). 
Modelling analyses (Meier et al., 2010; Purshouse et al., 2010; ScHARR, 2009) 
provide evidence in support of minimum pricing. Whilst promising in theory, only a 
small number of countries have implemented minimum pricing (i.e., Ukraine, Russia, 
Republic of Moldova, and Canada) and there is currently no empirical evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of this policy in practice. That being said, we understand 
that work is underway to evaluate minimum pricing in Canada. In Australia, proxy 
minimum pricing restrictions have been introduced in the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia and there is some evidence of the effectiveness of the policy (National 
Drug Research Institute, 2007). In Scotland, after a failed attempt during their first term 
in office, the re-elected SNP will introduce a Minimum Pricing Bill in late 2011. Their 
majority in the Scottish Assembly will likely mean that minimum pricing will come into 
force within the year. Accordingly, evidence-based research of this policy in Scotland 
should be available in due course. With pressure mounting from leading health bodies 
in other countries such as Australia and New Zealand to introduce minimum pricing, 
public health experts and government ministers will no doubt eagerly observe and 
await the findings of the Scottish situation. The NAAA posit that minimum pricing, 
as a complement to volumetric taxation, represents a promising avenue for affecting 
alcohol-related problems. In the UK, where the campaign for minimum pricing has been 
most strongly voiced, minimum pricing enjoys support from a wealth of public health 
organisations and advocates.
Recently, Sheron (2010) put forward an alternative policy suggestion in the UK 
to overcome two major caveats associated with minimum pricing and taxation. 
Specifically, a general taxation increase could put added pressure on licensed venues, 
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such as pubs, which are particularly suffering from reduced patronage from the 
recession. Since minimum pricing is not a tax, the additional revenue generated would 
be directed to alcohol retailers and manufacturers rather than to the Treasury. In fact, 
Griffith and Leicester (2010) estimate that this policy would transfer £710 million from 
consumers to retailers and producers, with the main beneficiaries being those retailers 
selling the most alcohol: i.e., Tesco (£230 million) and Asda (£130 million). Accordingly, 
Sheron (2010) proposes applying different VAT rates for on-trade and off-trade 
purchases; so that by reducing the VAT on on-trade sales from the current rate of 20 
per cent to 12 per cent, one could increase the rate of duty on off-trade (and minimum 
prices in tandem) without rising alcohol prices in pubs or losing taxation revenue. 
Sheron points out that the UK Treasury indicated reluctance to adopt this policy but 
failed to provide any explanation as to why. 
Bans on discounting and promotions. In recent years, alcohol marketing has 
experienced a marked increase in terms of the extent and repertoire of media and 
digital communication strategies used to appeal to consumers. This paper focussed 
on price discounts and promotions which research has linked to increased alcohol 
consumption (Babor et al., 1978, 1980; Kuo et al., 2003b; Thombs et al., 2008, 2009). 
Bans on promotions such as happy hour are in place in several EU member states (e.g., 
the Republic of Ireland), Canadian provinces (e.g., Alberta), and states in the USA (e.g., 
Kansas). However, in comparison to the previous three policies reviewed, this area has 
been relatively overlooked as there is a dearth of methodologically sound, empirical 
literature evaluating the impact of such restrictions on consumption and harm.
Regulations and codes of practice have been developed to limit unacceptable alcohol 
promotion practices. In Australia, individual codes of practice outline unacceptable and/
or acceptable promotion practices. Some of these codes are mandatory and enforceable 
(Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria), whilst others 
are voluntary (Western Australia, Queensland), and some states do not have any alcohol 
promotion guidelines (Tasmania). It should be noted that despite activity at state level, 
the National Preventative Health Taskforce (2009) did not make any recommendations 
relevant to price discounting and promotions, focusing instead on advertising more 
broadly. An inherent caveat with self-regulatory frameworks is that the system is open 
to abuse. A recent independent review in the UK indicated inconsistent application 
of industry-led guidelines governing alcohol promotions (KPMG, 2008); accordingly, 
legislation was passed in Scotland (Licensing [Scotland] Act 2005) and England and 
Wales (Mandatory Code of Practice) governing irresponsible alcohol promotions. We are 
unaware of equivalent research for Australia. 
POP promotions (i.e., free merchandise in a store or venue upon purchase of a given 
product) have become an increasingly popular alcohol marketing strategy. Research 
based in Wollongong indicates that POP promotions in the city’s metropolitan retail 
venues fell into three categories: gift with purchase, competitions, and buy some get 
some free offers (Jones & Lynch, 2007b). These promotions were also indicative of state 
and national-based promotions. Disconcertingly, the wider extant literature indicates 
that ownership of alcohol-related merchandise and reduced price is linked to increased 
alcohol consumption. Research in Sydney and Perth identified an average of 17.3 
POP promotions across 416 bottleshops and liquor stores, with participation generally 
requiring the purchase of a large number of standard drinks (Jones & Barrie, 2010). We 
concur with the authors that it is important for policymakers to introduce restrictions on 
such promotions.
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RELATED ISSUES
PUBLIC OPINION ON ALCOHOL POLICY 
Public opinion plays an important role in influencing public health policy (Wallin 
& Andréasson, 2005; Wilkinson, Room, & Livingston, 2009). A review of studies 
evaluating Australian public opinion on alcohol controls indicated that less than one 
quarter of Australians supported an increase in the price of alcohol  to reduce the 
problems associated with excessive alcohol use (Tobin, Moodie, & Livingstone, 2011). 
At the same time support was greater for an increased tax on alcohol if the additional 
revenue generated was directed towards the prevention and treatment of alcohol-related 
harms. In terms of specific price and tax reforms, a survey of Victorian residents in 2009 
indicated that 70 per cent supported imposing a minimum price on alcohol to ensure 
alcohol was not cheaper than bottled water; 67 per cent supported levying a tax rate on 
alcohol according to alcohol content per volume; and 61 per cent supported imposing a 
higher tax on those alcoholic beverages (e.g., bottled spirits, cask wine) that cause most 
harm (e.g., violence). Opinion was divided regarding an increase in the excise duty of 
alcopops which, as Tobin et al. (2011) suggest, may be due to variations in the wording 
and style of the various survey questions.
As observed in the literature (Tobin et al., 2011; Wallin & Andréasson, 2005), the 
public tend to be more supportive of distal alcohol controls (e.g., regulation of licences) 
rather than proximal controls (e.g., regulation of price) perhaps because the latter are 
considered to more directly affect individual drinking behaviour. This disparity suggests 
that while the Australian public are cognisant of the harms surrounding alcohol and 
recognise that some level of intervention is warranted, they do not consider the problem 
to be shared by the majority, ‘moderate’ drinking population (Tobin et al., 2011). This 
has important implications in terms of who the public believe should be responsible for 
offering solutions and to whom such interventions should be targeted. That is, a public 
who consider alcohol problems to impact only a small minority of people and whose 
beliefs focus on self-reliance will oppose government intervention and be supportive of 
targeted rather than universal solutions. By contrast, a public who believe that alcohol 
problems are the result of the social and economic environment one lives in and 
therefore beyond individual capacity, will expect government intervention and both 
universal and targeted controls (Tobin et al., 2011). In terms of alcohol policy reform in 
Australia, as Tobin et al. (2011) suggest, support could be garnered by ensuring that the 
intent of new policies and rationale for change is made clear to the public. 
Indeed this is of particular relevance to minimum pricing. As outlined above, minimum 
pricing has received considerable international attention in recent years and leading 
Australian public health organisations and advocates have urged the government to 
introduce it as part of a program of alcohol policy reform. The failure of minimum 
pricing proposals in Scotland in 2010 were attributed, at least in part, to media and 
public misunderstanding about how the policy works in practice and to lack of 
community engagement and education (Sheron, 2010). Accordingly, co-operation 
with relevant organisations to achieve broad sectoral support and co-ordination of a 
community campaign to educate the public about minimum pricing in terms that are 
meaningful to them (rather than engaging in a debate about price) holds promise for 
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securing public support for the policy. Indeed, in light of research which indicates 
that the public are supportive of controls that aim to protect children from exposure of 
alcohol promotions and innocent third parties from the effects of passive drinking, a 
useful starting point may be to emphasise the beneficial effects of minimum pricing on 
health, crime, road deaths, and child safety. 
SUBSTITUTION OR COMPLEMENTARITY WITH OTHER 
DRUGS 
Price-related interventions that target a particular alcohol beverage (e.g., alcopops) raise 
the possibility of substitution to other beverages. As Babor et al. (2010) point out, to 
date no systematic reviews have investigated cross-price elasticities between beverage 
categories, with most studies instead focusing on price changes over time or in different 
regions. 
Research evaluating the impact of alcohol price on illicit drug use in the general 
population is sparse, inconclusive and largely limited to cannabis use. Some studies 
provide evidence that cannabis acts as a substitute for alcohol in Australian samples 
(Cameron & Williams, 2001; Chaloupka & Laixuthai, 1997; Clements & Daryal, 2003) 
whereas other studies have found inconclusive results (Zhao & Harris, 2004) or evidence 
that alcohol is a complement to other drug use (Farrelly, Bray, Zarkin, Wendling, & 
Pacula, 1999; Pacula, 1998). The variation in findings could arise from difficulties 
associated with researching the use of products bought illicitly; lack of uniform illicit 
drug price data; or disparities in prices of illicit drugs, even by the same dealer (Manski, 
Pepper, & Petrie, 2001). Notwithstanding this, Ludbrook (2010b) suggests that given that 
alcohol consumption often serves as a precursor to other drug use, declines in alcohol 
consumption should (intuitively) lead to reductions in this progression.
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CONCLUSION
Amidst recent calls from public health experts for alcohol policy reform and public 
health expert opinion that alcohol misuse is a critical health prevention priority 
(National Preventative Health Taskforce, 2009; Hall & Chikritzhs, 2011), this paper 
aimed to provide a timely overview of pricing and taxation policies available to the 
Australian government. This conclusion sets out principles for policy reform based on 
the review of evidence. According to the evidence base, policies which increase alcohol 
prices in real terms, particularly taxation, are the most effective in reducing alcohol 
consumption and related harms (Anderson et al., 2009; Babor et al., 2010; Wagenaar et 
al., 2009). 
Over the past two decades, increases in the price of alcohol have outpaced increases in 
consumer prices in general by nearly 20 per cent in Australia. However, this is not the 
case for all alcoholic beverages. Whereas beer and spirits have become more expensive 
relative to other consumer items, wine has become substantially less expensive. Over 
the past decade or so income growth outpaced inflation making alcohol more affordable 
for the average Australian, although the repercussions of the GFC have recently halted 
that growth. Despite the literature’s focus on alcohol price, the affordability of alcohol is 
central to consumption decisions (Rabinovich et al., 2009). 
Ideally, the alcohol prices faced by consumers would reflect spillover costs of a 
particular person drinking a product at a particular point in time (Henry Review, 2010). 
Taxes can guide pricing but the concordance between the tax level and price of each 
and every alcohol product is far from perfect. This aside, the Australian alcohol taxation 
system could better guide prices towards levels that reduce harmful drinking in Australia. 
“Industry assistance, regional development and the promotion of small business...
should not be delivered through alcohol taxes” (Henry Review, 2010: 438-439). Unlike 
the alcohol taxation systems of the EU and Canada, one of the strengths of Australia’s 
system is that tax rates are indexed to the CPI. However, the ad valorum taxing of wine 
is anomalous and, based on evaluations of restrictions and a levy on cask wine in 
Australia, has public health implications. Other anomalies (e.g., the differential taxing of 
off-trade and on-trade beer) also warrant attention. 
There are two major perspectives on the direction of alcohol taxation policy 
reform in Australia; the Henry Review volumetric model and the public health 
advocacy volumetric tiered model. The incumbent federal government has rejected 
recommendations to reform the alcohol taxation system with a volumetric model citing 
the current wine glut as an impediment. To make headway in further debate public 
health advocates need to provide a compelling and cogent evidence base for a tiered 
model.
The alcohol industry does not incorporate taxation in the price of each and every 
alcohol product, as evidenced by sales of alcohol below cost, thus subverting the 
pricing signals of the tax system. This gives drinkers the opportunity to maintain harmful 
drinking practices by substituting away from higher priced (tax inclusive) products. A 
legislated minimum price would help circumvent this practice.
Insufficient empirical research and policy advocacy attention has been devoted to 
alcohol promotions and discounts, which are largely designed to markedly reduce the 
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cost of drinking the more alcohol consumed. Australian and international reliance on 
self-regulation of promotions and discounts is open to abuse where those regulations are 
not mandatory and enforceable. The limited research conducted around promotions and 
discounts indicates a link with harmful alcohol consumption. Government regulation 
may be necessary if self-regulation does not adequately control industry practice. 
Research on the extent to which guidelines and codes of practice are adhered to is 
critical and lacking.
The argument for minimum pricing and controls on promotions and discounts in 
Australia would be strengthened with evidence of the likely impacts, based on empirical 
modelling. This would require data on the price and quantity of all alcohol sold, which 
is not currently publicly available. The Australian government should follow New 
Zealand’s lead and require all alcohol outlets to provide this information free of charge 
to the government. Legal issues around the introduction of minimum pricing and the 
impact on competition need also to be clarified.
Public scepticism about a policy is likely to be a significant barrier to securing public 
support and its successful implementation (cf. Hagger et al., 2011; Tobin et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, policymakers must communicate to the general public what a given 
policy is designed to achieve to help overcome any misgivings and misunderstandings. 
Policymakers must also be mindful of the potential unintended consequences of policies 
designed to reduce alcohol consumption, particularly younger people’s substitution with 
illicit drugs. 
In sum, no single panacea or ‘silver bullet’ exists for tackling alcohol misuse. Each 
policy reviewed in this paper holds some promise, and it appears that they would be 
more successful in combination than as individual uncoordinated strategies. A recent 
review of the strength of alcohol control policies in 30 countries ranked Australia as fifth 
overall (Brand, Saisana, Rynn, Pennoni, & Lowenfels, 2007); it is imperative that federal 
and state governments continue to implement and expand policy initiatives to redress 
alcohol-related harm in our community. 
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2  The authors defined risky drinking as consumed an average of five or more drinks 
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2007). 
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